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ABSTRACT
Conceptions of Probability:
Reality Between a Rock and a Hard Place
(February, 1983)
Clifford E. Konold, B.A., San Diego State University
M.S., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Directed by: Professor Alexander Pollatsek
How do people's theories of uncertainty differ from formal
theories of probability? As an introduction to an investigation
of this question, brief reviews were provided of a) various schools of
thought within the science of probability, and b) research which has
tried to determine how consistent people ' s behavior is with that pre-
scribed by formal theories. While much of the research has suggested
that, in many respects, people are poor intuitive statisticians,
little has been said of how people actually arrive at probabilistic
judgments. More recent research which has attempted to describe the
strategies or heuristics that are used in reasoning about uncertainty
have inferred reasoning processes from group performance on question-
naire items.
This investigation employed a more direct methodology: Sixteen
undergraduates were interviewed and instructed to "think aloud" as
they solved several word problems which required probabilistic judg-
ments. Videotapes of the interviews were analyzed, and a model of
probabilistic reasoning was developed and described as an "outcome
approach" to uncertainty. According to the outcome approach, the
goal in questions of uncertainty is to predict the outcome of an event.
Since the primary focus is on an individual trial (as opposed to a
sample), predictions take the form of yes or no decisions of whether
an outcome will occur on a particular trial. These predictions are
then evaluated, after-the-fact, as having been either right or wrong.
Moreover, rather than employing a chance or "black-box" model of
uncertainty, outcome-oriented individuals often arrive at predictions
by identifying factors that are believed to cause or inhibit certain
outcomes
.
The validity of the outcome approach was supported with correla-
tional evidence based on coded portions of the interviews and with
reportage of interview segments. In addition, predictions were made
of how outcome-oriented subjects would respond to a different set of
questions. These predictions were verified in a second set of inter-
views with 12 of the original subjects.
While the outcome approach was described as being inconsistent
in several respects with formal theories of probability, it was por-
trayed as being internally consistent and valid in the context of
everyday decision-making.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Probability is a particularly slippery concept. The difficulty has
not so much to do with the fact that it is not one but a family of
concepts made up of separate yet not quite distinct members; many
concepts share this distinction. Nor is the difficulty a result of the
concept's conversion by mathematicians and philosophers into a technical
term; again, many of our concepts have been born again in scientific
garb and caused much less of a stir. What is uniquely troublesome about
probability is the territory it stakes out. It attempts to demarcate
the amorphous state somewhere between total ignorance and perfect
knowledge. And it is trying to keep one's footing in this nowhere land
that is particularly disturbing. Like a frictionless surface, it not
only trips you up, but keeps you sliding once you're down.
According to Hacking (1975), prior to the 17th century such a
middle ground between belief and knowledge did not exist, yet the term
probability had been around for some time. Hacking's thesis is too
complex to review here in detail. Briefly, he argues that in the early
to mid 1600's the concept of evidence changed such that information
about the nature of things could, for the first time, be found in the
things themselves. Prior to this, there existed a class of phenomena
that could be known through demonstration ( scientia ) and another class
of things that could only be testified to either by men of authority or
1
2through God-given signs ( opinio ). The word probability attached to the
latter class such that an opinion was probable if it had received the
stamp of approval of some authority figure. A "probable" belief was
thus an "approved" belief. But no amount of approval could ever make an
approved belief a matter of demonstrable knowledge.
Through the concept of "internal evidence," as Hacking calls it, a
bridge was created between belief and knowledge. The old term,
"probability," took on the function of describing the distance a belief
had traveled from total ignorance to certain knowledge. At the same
time, however, it also began to be used to refer to the tendency of
certain phenomena (chance processes) to produce stable frequencies.
This dual usage was no accident, for frequency data were a special
variety of the new type of evidence that permitted degrees of belief
separate from opinion. Now whether a belief was probable had less to do
with approval of authority than with the "approval" of data.
If we were to meet a 16th century ancestor, we would no doubt get
bogged down trying to understand what one another meant when we said
that something was probable. Unfortunantly , we need not do any time
traveling to observe or engage in a confusing dialogue about
probability: We need but walk into a classroom where statistics or
probability are being "taught" to find two parties floundering in an
attempt to understand one another. If Hacking is correct in his
analysis, a conversation with an early ancestor would be less
troublesome because of our having understood, through Hacking, their
concept of evidence and what it meant to "know" verses to "believe." My
3hope is that a similar understanding of how people informally view
uncertainty may facilitate communication between teachers and students
of probability. This thesis was undertaken with this goal in mind.
Some understanding of the source and nature of conflicting views of
probability can be gained from an examination of the various theoretical
schools of probability. Though they quibble amongst themselves over the
issue of the appropriate domain of probability, in those areas where
they overlap there is usually agreement concerning the numerical
probability assigned to some event. Closer to the issue being explored
in this study are empirical studies which have compared numeric answers
given by groups of subjects to the ideal or normative values according
to formal probability theory.
In the remainder of this chapter I will first provide a brief
description of various schools of probability and then summarize the
research which has attempted to determine how good the common person is
at statistics. As a final introduction to a report of two original
studies, I will stress the importance not only of generating data
showing that the "informal probabilist" is non-normative, but of
creating theories of how people reason about uncertainty—of why they
arrive at the answers they do. The need for theories of this nature is
especially critical if one's goal is to foster better communication in
the teaching and learning process.
Facets of Probability
Our present concept of probability took form around 1660 when
Pascal, Huygens, Leibniz, Fertnat, and others somewhat independently
developed formalizations for treating such diverse phenomena as games of
chance, legal decisions and annuities. In a letter to Fermat, dated
October 27, 1654, Pascal reviewed their independently-arr ived-at
solutions to a problem of how to divide stakes in an interrupted game of
chance. He demonstrated that while, on the surface, their approaches
appeared different, they were, in fact, comparable. He concluded with a
statement that, in retrospect, seems prophetic: "Now our harmony has
begun again" (Maistrov, 1974, p. 39). The harmony was two-part,
consisting of the acknowledged need to discriminate between independent
and dependent events, and of the addition and multiplication rules which
allowed for the calculation of the union and intersection of independent
events
.
What came into being at that time was, to strain the metaphor, a
new tune. What was not so new were the lyrics—"How probable is it
that—
" Since that time we have been plagued with a concept of
probability which has at least two different but related aspects. On
the one hand it is a somewhat vague epistemological notion of the degree
to which some belief is held to be true; on the other, it refers, in a
precise way, to the relatively stable frequencies exhibited by some
phenomena. The difference between these two can be illustrated by
comparing the two propositions below:
51) "My confidence is X that the statement, 'I will
live to the age of 60,' is true."
2) "Accoring to life expectancy tables, my chances of
living to the age of 60 are X."
The first is a combination of two propositions—"I will live to the age
of 60" and, "My confidence is X that the statement is true." The nature
of the expressed belief is not specific, but we can assume that it
derives, legitimately or not, from a variety of sources. This is termed
epistemological probability.
The second proposition is different in that there is no question as
to the source of the number. It is derived from available frequency
data. This is aleatory probability (cf. Hacking, 1975).
Not only have these two meanings clung tenaciously to the same
word, but, since the time of Pascal, several schools have sprung up on
both sides of the probability street. On the aleatory side, three
schools have developed:
Classical Theory
According to the classical definition, which was prevalent until
the time of Bernoulli, the probability of an outcome is simply the ratio
of the number of favorable possibilities to the total number of basic
alternatives. Thus, the probability of rolling a 3 on a 6-sided die is
1/6 since only one possibility is favorable to the outcome, while 5 are
not. An obvious assumption, and the major limitation of this
definition, is that the outcome alternatives must be equally likely.
6Frequentist Theory
According to a frequentist theory (e.g., Reichenbach, 1949; von
Mises, 1957) the probability of an event is its limiting frequency of
occurrence in an infinite series of trials. Thus the probability of
rolling a 3 on a particular die is the relative number of occurrences if
the die were rolled an infinite number of times.
Propensity Theory
To the frequentist, the probability of an event refers to its
frequency in the long run. One cannot, therefore, sensibly talk of the
probability of a single occurrence. According to propensity theorists
(e.g., Hacking, 1965; Mellor, 1971). however, the probability of rolling
a 3 is an inherent, physical characteristic of the die. As a result,
probability is viewed as something that belongs to each individual
trial
.
On the epistemological side of probability, two major schools can
be distinguished:
Personalist Theory
According to this view (e.g., Ramseyt 1931; Savage, 195*0, all
probability is a matter of personal judgment, and is thus subjective.
7By assuming that such judgments are internally consistent, however, a
measurement technique is hypothesized that involves an exhaustive
ordinal comparison of a person's judgments. Using Bayes- theorem as a
normative algorithm for adjusting these judgments given new information,
the theory can be used as a model of rational decision-making.
Logical Relations Theory
According to these theorists (e.g., Carnap, 1950; Jeffreys, 1948),
the confidence in a proposition is the extent to which it is logically
implied by some other proposition. Since the relations between
propositions of this type are defined formally and do not rely on the
specific content of the propositions, the theory is viewed as an
objective as opposed to subjective theory. (For an in depth treatment
of these various theories, see Mackie, 1973.)
While valiant attempts have been made by advocates of both aleatory
and epistemological probability to annex the concept, the division has
remained. Though arguments among the theoretical schools have generally
revolved around questions of the internal coherence of the competing
theories, the question of psychological validity has also been raised as
a concern. The match between a probabilistic theory and actual behavior
has been especially important in personalist theory. Similarity to
actual decision-making has been cited as one of its strong points:
8The notion of probability which we have described is without
doubt the closest to that of 'the man in the street'; better
yet, it is that which he applies every day in practicaljudgments What more adequate meaning could be discovered
of a notion? (de Finetti, 1964, p. 111)
Dempster (1968) points out that the entanglement of theoretical and
behavioral considerations has its beginnings in the early history of
probability
:
The earliest mathematical developments of the theory of
probability arose from games of chance, where the central
problem was to settle a rule of behavior, and the numerical
probabilities implicit in the developed models were
indentified after the rules of behavior, (p. 64)
In the late 1950's, psychologists interested in human
decision-making began viewing statistical theory as providing a
normative solution for judgments under uncertainty. These investigators
wanted to determine the extent to which actual behavior conformed to the
normative statistical solutions.
Peterson and Beach (1967), in their review of the research,
concluded that probability and statistical theory provide a good first
approximation of actual human decision-making under uncertainty.
Subjects seem to be quite good at estimating descriptive parameters such
as means and variances, and somewhat less able in tasks involving
statistical inference. For example, subjects' solutions have been found
to differ from normative solutions in the following cases:
1) While subjects use new information to revise prior
probabilities, their posterior values are less affected by the new
information than they ought to be (Edwards, Lindman , & Phillips, 1965).
92) In inferring parameters from samples, subjects tend to minimize
the contribution of extreme cases (Beach & Scopp, 1967).
3) In making inferences about correlations from 2X2 contingency
tables, subjects frequently rely on either one cell or on both positive
diagonals (Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Ward & Jenkins, 1965).
4) Subjects underestimate the importance of sample size in
assessing the diagnostic value of a derived statistic (Edwards & Kramer,
1963).
5) Over independent trials, subjects behave as if the probability
of an outcome changes (Peterson & Beach, 1967). They also construct
"random" sequences that have too few long runs (Brown, 1964).
While research comparing actual to normative judgments under
conditions of uncertainty had produced some interesting findings,
Peterson and Beach (1967) concluded their review by stressing the need
for a more descriptive approach and the contruction of psychological
theories that would better account for human probabilistic reasoning.
Since that time, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have been the most
prolific in generating explanations that account for non-normative
statistical behavior. In a series of articles, they have suggested that
because of limited information-processing capabilities, people use
various judgment heuristics or rules that allow them to summarize large
amounts of data and quickly arrive at decisions. These heuristics are
described below:
1) With the representativeness heurtistic , the probability of a
sample is assessed by noting the degree to which it shares essential
characteristics with the parent population.
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2) With the availability heuristic
, probability is assessed
according to the ease with which relevant instances of an event can be
brought to mind .
3) With the adjusting and anchoring heuristic
, new information is
used to revise prior probabilities in such a way that the resultant
values are closer to the initial probabilities. (Kahneman & Tversky,
1972, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973.)
While these heuristics usually produce adequate estimates,
limitations in the amount and type of information that they are
sensitive to leads to predictable judgmental errors in some situations.
These heuristics, for example, have been used to explain the gambler's
fallacy, insensitivity to sample size, and misconceptions involving
random sequences and regression effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
That these heuristics have been integrated into attribution theory and
inspired some new lines of investigation in the field of social
psychology is evidence of their generalizability (cf. Nisbett & Ross,
1980)
.
However, in terms of describing an informal theory of probability
that would be useful in instruction, these studies have three major
limitations. First, they have employed mostly questionnaire
methodologies which provide very indirect information about how subjects
are actually reasoning about probabilistic situations. Second, only
measures of group performance are generally reported, which masks
individual differences that could be especially important in
instruction. Third, the judgment heuristics are not alternative
11
theories of probability. Rather they are viewed as short-cut procedures
for arriving at probability judgments. The question of the underlying
theories people might hold is left unaddressed, yet the assumption
inherent in asking subjects to provide numeric probabilities in response
to questions is that subjects view probability consistent with formal
theories. If this is not the case, subject responses cannot be easily
interpreted
.
More recently Kahneman and Tversky (1982) have attempted to
describe several variants of probability as suggested in the usage of
the term in natural language. Similar attempts have been previously
made (Lucas, 1 970; Mackie, 1973; Toulmin, 1958). The belief that
informal theories of probability can be inferred from an analysis of
language is in the spirit of Hacking's (1975) analysis and is a major
assumption in the method to be used in this investigation of informal
conceptions of probability. A brief review of the objectives and
assumptions of this thesis follows.
Objectives and Assumptions
In this investigation I draw heavily on the image of probability as
a concept that is "rooted in a dialogue" (Lucas, 1970, p. 9), that
"exists in discourse and not in the minds of speakers" (Hacking, 1975,
p. 16) . Using the metaphor of a conceptual space much the same as Kuhn
(1962) talks of paradigms or Foucault (1973) of epistemes, Hacking
suggests that
12
concepts are less subject to our decisions than a positivist
would think, and that they play out their lives in, as it
were, a space of their own All those who... employ the
concept use it within this matrix of possiblities
. (p. 15)
As previously mentioned, I view students and teachers of
probability as possessing two different frameworks which, to the extent
that they are compatable, make communication possible. To the extent,
however, that they differ, communication is problematic, and
persistently so. We can assume that the teacher's concept is similar to
one of the schools (and probably to the frequentist theory) as
summarized above. The major objective of this project is to explore and
describe informal concepts of probability—the ideas held by
non-theorists who, nevertheless, comes into contact with uncertainty
daily; the ways by which they determine what "the chances are" in
different situations; and the meaning of expressions related to such a
determination
.
The fact that the status of the concept of probability is disputed
by theorists provides some clues as to the nature of the difficulties
encountered in this study. No doubt the varieties of informal theories
are staggeringly numerous if described in detail. I proceed on the
assumption that the majority of people can be described as falling into
a few categories. I assume, too, that peoples' notions of probability
are, for the most part, internally consistent and valid in the context
of their environment. By exposing them to a variety of problems, I have
attempted to determine if and at what points their approaches to the
problems change, and in this way gain access to their "informal
13
probability axioms." This approach is ethnographic is spirit in that I
attempt to provide phenomenal (world-as-perceived) as opposed to nomenal
(world-de facto) descriptions, using research methods (the indepth
interview) appropriate to such description (Magoon, 1977; Wilson, 1977;
Marton, 1978). The basic design of the study involves an initial set of
interviews with students who have had varying amounts of exposure to
formal probability. From subjects' responses to several questions
involving uncertainity
,
a model is hypothesized which accounts for their
performance. From this model predictions are made of how subjects will
respond to a different set of questions. These predictions are then
tested on the same group of subjects in another interview. This last
step is undertaken in an attempt to overcome the problem of the
relatively subjective nature of interpretations of interview data (see
Konold & Well
, 1981)
.
My interest in this question has developed in two contexts. First,
research on related topics (e.g., Well, Pollatsek & Konold, 1981) has
suggested that we may have been underestimating the extent to which
people view probability differently from theorists. I have been
particularly impressed by subjects's unwillingness in interviews to
provide quantitative estimates of probability. Second, the question has
been motivated by attempts to teach probability in the context of a
course in psychological statistics. It seems reasonable that to the
extent that instructors have insight into the particulars of informal
theories, they would be more effective in helping students understand
alternative approaches. The differences between formal and informal
14
theories may provide sources of explanation for the difficulties
encountered in teaching; the similarities between the two approaches may
point to inroads from one to the other.
CHAPTER II
METHOD: INTERVIEW 1
Subjects
Seventeen undergraduate students at the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, volunteered to participate in the study by
placing their names on a sign-up sheet that was posted in the psychology
building. Subjects were offered a choice of either extra course credit
or $5.00 for their participation. They were informed that they would be
asked to talk about what they thought would happen in various situations
that involved uncertain outcomes, and that they would be asked to
participate in a similar study the following semester. One interview
was terminated before completion when it was thought that the subject
was experiencing a high degree of stress. Data from this interview were
not analysed. Information concerning the sex, major, and math and
statistics background of each subject is included in Table 1, Appendix
A.
15
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Procedure
Setting
Subjects were interviewed individually. Upon entering the room,
subjects were asked to read and sign a consent form which described the
study as being motivated by the desire to better understand the kinds of
relevant knowledge students possess before or after having completed a
statistics course. They were instructed that they would be given
several problems that would require them to predict what they thought
would happen in situations involving uncertainty. They were told that
the particular answers they gave were of less interest than their
reasoning that led to the answer. Accordingly, they were instructed to
"think aloud" as they attempted to solve each problem, verbalizing their
thoughts as they occurred rather than attempting to reconstruct them at
some later time. A felt pen and piece of paper were provided, and
subjects were told that they could use these for any figuring or drawing
that would help them to think or communicate their thoughts about the
problems.
The subject and interviewer sat on the same side of a table and
approximately three feet apart so that they would both appear on the
videotape. Subjects were aware that they were being videotaped, and the
recording equipment was in full view. I conducted all of the
interviews. I had had no contact with any of the subjects prior to
recruting them for the study. My experience with conducting and
17
analyzing interviews of this type had begun about two and a half years
before these data were collected.
Problems
Twelve problems were initially developed and piloted in twelve
interviews with other subjects. These problems were chosen to vary on
several dimensions that either were regarded as important within various
theoretical perspectives (e.g., repeatability and independence of
trials) or were thought of as potentially important to some individuals
(e.g., past vs. future outcomes and outcome utility). Five problems
were finally selected for inclusion in the first set of interviews.
However, subjects' responses to only three of these problems will be
treated in this report. These problems are presented below. (The
organization of the problems into paragraphs is meant to indicate
clusters of questions that were related and does not have any other
meaning vis-a-vis the way questions were presented during the
interview.) Standardized probes that were asked of most subjects are
also included. Non-standardized probes for the most part consisted of.
requests to clarify or repeat a statement and reminders to verbalize.
However, unique probes spontaneously developed to test hypotheses about
subjects' reasoning were also employed. The interview format,
therefore, could best be described as indepth (cf. Konold & Well, 1981)
in which extensive probing by the interviewer is allowed, provided the
probes do not direct subject thinking. Appendix B includes an entire
18
transcript of the interview with Subject 11 and provides a
representative example of the interviewing style and the nature of the
two problems not included in this report.
Weatner Problem. What does it mean when a weather forecaster
says that tomorrow there is a 70% chance of rain? What does
the number, in this case the 70%, tell you? How do they
arrive at a specific number?
Suppose the forecaster said that there was a 70% chance
of rain tomorrow and, in fact, it didn't rain. What would you
conclude about the statement that there was a 70% chance of
rain?
Suppose you wanted to find out how good a particular
forecaster's predictions were. You observed what happened on
ten days for which a 70% chance of rain had been reported. On
three of those ten days there was no rain. What would you
conclude about the accuracy of this forecaster? If he had
been perfectly accurate, what would have happened? What
should have been predicted on the days it didn't rain? With
what percent chance?
Numbers are often assigned to various events like
elections, sporting events, causes of death. For example, you
might hear something like, "A person's chances of dying before
the age of 40 are 25%." What does the 25% tell you? Or you
might hear, "The Equal Rights Ammendment has a 25% chance of
being ratified by the June, 1982 deadline." What does the 25%
in this case tell you?
Misfortune problem . I know a person to whom all of the
following things happened on the same day. First, his son
totalled the family car and was seriously injured. Next, he
was late for work and nearly got fired. In the afternoon he
got food poisoning at a fast-food restaurant. Then in the
evening he got word that his father had died. How would you
account for all these things happening on the same day? Have
you ever had something very unlikely happen to you? To
someone you know? How do you make sense of a day when
everything seems to go wrong?
Bone problem . I have here a bone that has six surfaces. I've
written the letters A through F, one on each surface.
(Subject is handed the bone which is labeled A, B, C, and D on
the surfaces around the long axis, and E and F on the two
surfaces at the ends of the long axis.) If you were to roll
19
that which side do you think would most likely land upright'
How likely is it that x will land upright? (Subject is askedto roll the bone to see what happens.) What do you conclude
about your prediction? What do you conclude having rolled thebone once? Would rolling the bone more times help you
conclude which side is most likely to land upright?
(Subject is asked to roll the bone as many times asdesired.) What do you conclude having rolled the bone severaltimes? How many times would you want to roll the bone before
you were absolutely confident about which side is most likelv
to land upright?
One day I got ambitious and rolled the bone 1000 times
and recorded the results. This is what I got. (Subject is
handed the list which showed A-50, B-279, C-244, D-375, E-52
F-0.) What do you conclude looking at these? Would you be
willing to conclude that D is more likely than B? That B is
more likely than C? That E is more likely than A? If asked
what the chance was of rolling a D, what would you say?
I'm going to ask you to roll the bone ten times, but
before you do, to predict how many of each side you will get.
How did you arrive at those specific values? (Subject rolls
the bone and notes the results of each trial on the sheet of
paper. After the 8th trial the subject is asked:) What is
your best guess of what you will get on the next two rolls?
(After the last trial the subject is asked:) How do you feel
about your predictions? If you were going to roll the bone
ten more times, what would you predict that you would get?
Presentation
The problems were presented orally by the interviewer. Two orders
of presentation were used, the order being alternated on each successive
interview. Order A was the sequence Weather, Bone and Misfortune
followed by the two other problems. Order B was the reversed sequence.
Each interview required approximately one hour. Following the
interview, subjects were told that questions about the project would be
answered following the second interview which would be conducted during
the next semester.
CHAPTER III
ANAL YSIS AND DISCUSSION: INTERVIEW 1
The aim of this project is to articulate an informal approach to
probability that allows peoples' statements and expressed beliefs
concerning probability to be seen as interrelated and, ideally,
logically consistent. The videotaped interviews and rough transcripts
made from the videotapes provided a set of statements from which such a
theory could be developed.
The analysis comprised two general and interrelated stages of
hypothesis formation. The first stage involved repeated reviews of the
transcripts and videotapes with the purpose of answering questions of
the form, "What is this subject trying to say about x?" An answer to
such a question is regarded as a descriptive hypothesis (cf. Konold &
Well, 1981)—descriptive in the sense that it simply attempts to restate
what the subject was attempting to communicate, and an hypothesis
because we can never be sure that we understand what was meant to be
communicated. Attention was especially focused on statements that
seemed inconsistent with any formal theory of probability and that were
common to several subjects.
The second stage was to attempt to infer from the collection of
statements or descriptive hypotheses a set of underlying "axioms" from
which the statements could be deduced. This stage is conceived by
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Konold and Well ( 1981) as one involving the formulation of interpretive
hypotheses-interpretive in that the attempt is made to go beyond what
the subject is explicitly communicating and to infer what tacit
knowledge the subject must possess in order that their expressions
appear internally consistent.
In this chapter I will describe an informal approach to probability
which was deduced from an analysis of the interviews and which I have
labeled the "outcome approach." This approach will be decribed as one
in which the primary objective is to predict the outcome of an
individual trial. Given this objective, questions explicity asking for
the probability of an outcome are translated into questions of whether,
in fact, the outcome will occur. To give an initial impression of the
approach, two composite interviews are juxtaposed below. On the left is
a prototype of the outcome approach; on the right, a prototype of a
frequency interpretation. These prototypes are assembleges of excerpts
from several subjects (as noted) and should not, therefore, be regarded
as typical responses. The prototypes are presented as ideal
characterizations of subjects who reason according to the outcome
approach on the one hand, and according to a frequency interpretation on
the other. While a few of the subject protocols will closely resemble
one or the other of these prototypes, most subjects, in fact, will be
described as in a conflict stage somewhere between their previously-held
outcome approach and a recently-exposed-to frequency interpretation.
Many of the subjects interviewed had taken a statistics course in a
university psychology department. Since the statistical approach of the
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social sciences is almost exclusively in the tradition of Fisher or
Neyman-Pearson, subjects' exposure to formal probability had been
frequentist in nature. For this reason, the conflicts that subjects are
typically expressing are assumed to have resulted from attempts to
incorporate principles and conclusions of frequentist theory with
prior-held theories. If students who had been exposed to one of the
other formal theories of probability were interviewed, different
conflicts might have been manifest that could not be understood within
the framework of the outcome approach. This represents a limitation of
this study. However, since most of probability and statistics
instruction is based on frequentist theory, the thinking displayed here
should be typical of most students exposed to statistics.
The prototypes presented below will also provide some sense of the
flow of the interviews. An entire transcript of Subject 11 is included
in Appendix B and serves both to give a more extensive account of the
nature of the interviews and as a good example of a subject caught in
conflict between an outcome and a frequentist approach.
Table 2. Prototype of outcome-oriented and frequentist responses
to the Weather, Misfortune, and Bone problems.
Outcome Approach Frequency Interpretation
Weather Problem
I: What does it mean when a weather forecaster says that tomorrow
there is a 70% chance of rain?
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S6: I just think of that
as a pretty good chance
that there'll be rain.
If he said 50% chance,
I wouldn't think much
about it. But when he
says 70%, 1 would think
of thinking about an
umbrella
.
S4: 70% means that the
chances that it will rain
are seven out of ten,
according to him.
I: What does the number, in this case the 70%, tell you?
S12: Well, it's close to
100. It's more of a
positive figure than
,
say, 30 would be. It
represents a "C" in
grades. Just a positive
number
.
S4: Well, it says that
there's a 30% chance that
it isn't going to rain.
I: Suppose the forecaster said there was a 70% cnance of rain
tomorrow and, in fact, it didn't rain the next day. What would you
conclude about the statement that there was a 70% chance of rain?
S12: Well, that maybe
they just fouled up.
Or during the night,
the precipitation or
something changed in
a different direction
because of other
outside factors.
S4: Well, on the basis of
just the sample, I think
an unrational response
would be that the
prediction was wrong.
But, in fact, 30% is a
pretty good probability
that it's—it's not
miniscule that it's not
going to rain.
I: Suppose you wanted to find out how good a particular
forecaster's predictions were. You observed what happened on ten
days for which a 70% chance of rain had been reported. On three of
those ten days there was no rain. What would you conclude about
the accuracy of this forecaster?
S3: Well, I suppose he
probably should do
better than that. I
assume they're trying
S2: He was exactly right.
Seven out of ten times is
70%. And he concluded
70% chance of rain all ten
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their best. They're times
. ^ % f
not trying to feed time
t
6
you wrong information.
Misfortune
I: I know of a person to whom all of the following things happened
on the same day.... How would you account for all these thingshappening on the same day?
S1 1 : Each of those is a
separate event, and why
they would happen on the
same day, I don't know.
I'm trying to look for
clues, you know, trying
to figure out why. I
would probably just look
at each one individually
—if his son was just a
bad driver or if he was
a good driver and he'd
never gotten into an
accident—try to figure
out something about
—
Maybe he'd had it good
for too long and there
was just like all these
bad things piling up,
just waiting to come at
him.
S2: It's arbitrary, some-
what. It just occurred.
I don't see any other way I
could explain how they all
occurred on the same day.
I could see how if the guy
totalled his car, he'd
probably be late for work.
Even though it's unlikely
to occur, like if it only
happens 1 in 1000 times,
if you live 1000 days the
odds are it's going to
happen to you. So even
though it's unlikely for an
every-day occurrence , when
you consider all the days
that you live, it's not so
unlikely.
Bone Problem
I: If you were to roll this, which side do you think would most
likely land upright?
S9: Wow. If I were a math
major this would be easy.
B is nice and flat, so if
D fell down , B would be
up. I'd go with B.
S2: I don't think I could
tell you without rolling
it. This is not like a
die, and I think that there
is no way of me knowing
personally without
experimentation
.
S4: I could only give my
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best guess. I'd have to
say B up.
I: And about how likely do you think B is to land upri
S9: I wouldn't say it's much
more likely. It depends
on the roll, I think.
ght?
SM: I'll give a big bias
to B. I'll say 33%.
I: So what do you conclude having rolled it once?
S10: Wrong again.
[B] didn't come up.
S15: I don't conclude
anything. Can I roll it
again?
I: Would rolling it more times help you conclude which side, if
any, was most likely to land upright?
S9: No
. I don't know.
I think it's difficult
to decide which is more
likely. I don't see
how you really can
,
just by looking at it.
That's my opinion.
SI : Oh definitely. I
mean that's the only way
I could tell for sure.
I think the only way with a
thing like this is to just
keep rolling it and just
record the results.
These prototypes were assembled and juxtaposed primarily to
highlight three features of the outcome approach:
a) the tendency to interpret questions about the probability of an
outcome as questions about the outcome of a single trial;
b) the use of probability values as a means of arriving at a yes or
no decision which, after-the-fact, can be evaluated as having been
either right or wrong; and
c) the reliance on causal as opposed to statistical or chance
explanations
.
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In the remainder of this chapter a more formal treatment of these
features of the outcome approach will be undertaken. First, the
features will be elaborated, and excerpts from interviews will be used
to demonstrate their form and pervasiveness. Then, further evidence of
the basic role and interrelatedness of the features will be offered in
the form of a) their co-occurrence in subject protocols, and b) their
tendency, in contraposition to principles of frequentist theory, to
produce conflict states in certain subjects. Finally, as an
introduction to the analysis of a second set of interviews, predictions
will be made as to how outcome-oriented subjects will respond to a novel
series of questions. This last step is viewed as particularly important
because it provides the opportunity to subject the outcome approach to a
more critical analysis in which disconfirming evidence of a more
objective nature is sought.
Characteristics of the Outcome Approach
Outcome-oriented subjects, when asked the probability of repeatable
events, believe they are being asked about the results of a single
trial. This tendency to focus on the outcome of a single trial will be
referred to as the single-trial feature. This contrasts with the
frequency approach where the primary focus is a sample of trials, and in
which probability is conceptualized as the relative frequency of
occurrence of an outcome in a large sample.
Closely related to the single-trial feature is the objective of the
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outcome approach which is to predict outcomes of trials in a yes-or-no
fashion. This objective will be referred to as the decision feature and,
again, contrasts with the frequency approach in which the objective is
usually to predict the average value or percent of some outcome in a
large number of trials. The predictive feature in the frequency
approach does not involve a yes or no prediction as it does in the case
of the outcome approach. Rather, the prediction takes the form of an
estimate of the long-run frequency of occurrence of a particular
outcome
.
The outcome approach will be seen to be more similar to a
personalist approach in that in both cases a probability value gauges
the degree of belief that a particular outcome will occur on a given
trial. However, a personalist approach does not necessarily involve
yes/no predictions. A personalist, having made the statement, "The
probability of x is p," would attempt to verify the accuracy of this
proposition by determining what percent of events assessed the
probability p actually occur. For example, if a personalist estimated
the probability of several independent and unique events to be .60, and
these were "good" estimates, it would be expected that approximately 60%
of these outcomes would occur, while 40% would not. In the outcome
approach, a prediction is only "good" if the predicted outcome occurs: A
prediction has no specfic meaning in relation to future or past
predictions of the same or similar outcomes.
The remainder of this section is divided into two major
subsections. In the first, the single-trial and decision features will
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be considered together and illustrated using excerpts from subject
interviews. In the second subsection, the third feature of the outcome
approach will be similarly elaborated and exemplified. This
characteristic, referred to as the causal feature, involves the belief
that chance phenomena can be analyzed in a mechanistic or causal
framework. This will be contrasted with formal approaches to
probability which are based on a chance or "black-box" conceptualization
of uncertainty.
Predictability of Individual Trials
As mentioned above, in this subsection the single-trial and
decision features are considered together. An explanation for why they
are not being discussed separately is necessary for understanding coding
procedures which will be described later and also will help clarify the
perceived relation between these two features.
Though aspects of subjects' reasoning can separately be described
as consistent with either the single-trial or decision feature, in fact,
in these protocols evidence for these two features almost always occurs
together in the same sentence or proposition. Thus, they appear as a
functional unit such that outcome-oriented individuals see as their task
predicting in yes/no fashion the results of a particular trial. This
co-occurrence may be explained in part by the fact that the attempt was
not directly made in the first set of interviews to explore how a
subject's view of a series of trials might differ from that of a single
trial. (Some data relevant to this question are presented in the
disoussion or the second set of interviews., Bat there is good reason
to believe that the virtually perfect co-occurrence of statements which
support the single-trial and decision feature reflects a logical
connection between the two: If the single-trial Is viewed as the
appropriate unit in the treatment of uncertainty, predictions which
involve average number of outcomes have no basis. Average outco.es can
only be computed and used to describe the probability of a single trial
when a series of trials is seen as a legitimate unit of analysis over
which an average can be computed.
Given a single trial as the unit of analysis, it therefore makes
sense that associated predictions would simply involve a decision of
whether or not a particular outcome would occur. The connection between
these two features becomes even more understandable upon consideration
of the fact that the majority of uncertain situations that people face
are situations which will never be exactly repeated (cf. Fhaner
, 1977)
and for which an unequivocal decision of yes or no must be made (e.g.,
the question faced by a jurer of a defendant's guilt or innocence).
In the outcome approach, predictions of individual trials thus take
the form of "yes," "no," and occasionally " I-don ' t-know" decisions of
whether or not a particular outcome will be observed. Once a trial has
been conducted, a yes/no prediction is evaluated as either "right" or
"wrong." This evaluation of outcome predictions will be described
first. Related excerpts from both the Weather and Bone problems will be
presented to illustrate this tendency to evaluate a prediction as either
right or wrong after a single trial.
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Retrospective evaluations of predictions
. In the Weather problem,
a situation was posed where a prediction of 70% chance of rain had been
made for a day on which no rain fell. Asked what they would conclude
about the accuracy of the statement that there was a 70% chance of rain,
six of the subjects responded that the statement must have been
incorrect
:
S3: Well, he's inaccurate, but everyone's entitled to a mistake.
I still wouldn't not listen to him just because he made a
mistake that day.
S13: Well, like I said, I don't really believe too much of what
they say 'cause it's not always true. They said they
thought it was going to rain, but it didn't.
S11: ...and even if it was 90%— I would be carrying with me the
idea that he .. .predicted that it was going to rain the next
day with a 70% chance and he was wrong And now I'll take
that into consideration on the next occasion, that they were
wrong on one occasion
.
Two of the subjects (one of whose response is included in the
prototype above) suggested that when the prediction was initially made
it was correct, but that things had changed since then:
S9: Well, that it probably was correct at the time that he said
it, but by the time it went out it probably wasn't really
correct
.
These evaluations of single-trial predictions as either right or
wrong are inconsistent with a frequency interpretation which is
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concerned with a sequence of trials rather than with the occurrence or
non-occurrence of a single predicted outcome. In the context of the
outcome approach, however, a yes or no prediction of a single trial is
the objective. And given a yes or no prediction, it is appropriate to
evaluate the prediction as either right or wrong once the outcome of the
trial is known.
Subjects' performance on the Bone problem provides further evidence
of the pervasiveness of this tendency to evaluate outcome predictions as
right or wrong. In the Bone problem nine of the subjects made comments
to the effect that their prediction of which side would most likely land
up was either right or wrong. In the case of Subjects 1, 3, and 9 these
statements were uttered spontaneously after they had rolled the bone the
first time:
S1! It was C. All right. Well, I was wrong.
S9: So it was the other surface. Well, it's kind of similar to
the other sides I said. I guess I just took a guess—
a
gamble. I guess it could land on any of them.
At the end of the Bone problem. Subject 3 had concluded that B was
the most likely, and as the bone was being removed, she interjected:
S3: You mean I can't roll it to find out?
I: Oh, sorry. Go ahead and roll it.
S3: Watch me blow everything I said. [Rolls a B] B. Oh, I was
right.
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The remainder of the evaluative statements made by Subjects 5, 10,
11, 12, 13, and 16 came in response to the probe, "What do you conclude
from having rolled the bone once?"
S5: That I was right. That I logically worked out which would be
the most likely one to come up and I was right.
S11: I guess it was right. So I guess I looked at the right
things, or whatever.
Most of the subjects' comments seemed to apply to both the results
of that roll and their prediction. However, more consistent with a
frequency interpretation, two of the subjects, while declaring that they
had been wrong, suggested that perhaps their prediction was still right
but had just not occurred on that particular roll:
S16: I only rolled it once. The one time I rolled it I was
wrong, but it doesn't mean that it's incorrect.
S10: Wrong again.
I: Why do you say you were wrong?
S10: Well, D didn't come up.
I: What do you conclude from having rolled it once? Do you
question now whether D is the most likely one to come up
or—
?
S10: Well, I'd question it a little, but that was only one roll.
Evidence from both the Bone and Weather problem has been offered
(and is summarized in Table 3. Appendix A) which supports the claim that
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subjects take questions explicitly requesting probabilities and encode
them into ones that ask instead for a decision of which alternative will
occur on a particular trial. Once the trial has been conducted, these
predictions can retrospectively be evaluated as either right or wrong.
Performance on the Weather problem also provides the opportunity to
explore the nature of the actual predictions.
Yes/no predictions
. In the Weather problem, subjects were first
asked what it meant when a weather forecaster predicts a 70% chance of
rain. Answers to this question provide an indication of the nature of
predictions in the outcome approach. In the following excerpts, rather
than interpreting 70% as the probability of rain, subjects apparently
encode 70% as "rain, but I could be wrong," often using the values 100%
("definite rain") and 50% ("I don't know") as extremes with which 70%
can be compared.
I: What does the specific number, in this case the 70%, tell
you?
S12: Actually, I never really thought about it. 70%. Well, it's
close to 100. It's more of a positive figure then, say, 30
would be. It represents a "C" in grades, which students
tend to think about a lot. Just, you know, a positive
number
.
S3: Well, 70%—more than likely it's going to rain. I think
50%—it's 50% it will, 50% it won't. But 70% means more
than likely it will rain.
S 1 3 : That there is more of a chance of it raining than not
raining. Like if he said, maybe, 55% chance, then I'd
34
be—well 50/50—even if he said 50% chance, I still think
I d stick more to it being a nice day out then it raining
But 70% pushes it a little bit closer to definite rain
S15:
...And when I hear a probability, like the 70% chance, I
think, "Well, it's going to rain," you know. Because it's a
higher probability I take that as fact.
S6: I just think of that as a pretty good chance that there'll
be rain. If he said, like 50% chance, I wouldn't think that
much about it. But when he says 70%, I would think of
thinking about ah umbrella, or something like that.
I: What does the specific number, in this case the 70%, tell
you?
S6: Well, it tells me that it's over 50%, and so, that's the
first thing I think of. And, well, I think of the half way
mark between 50% and say 100% to be like, well, 75%. And
it's almost that, and I think that's a pretty good chance
that there'll be rain.
Two observations are worth noting in regard to the above excerpts.
First, it is clear that in the above protocols, subjects translate the
statement "70% chance of rain" into the more definitive, and qualitative,
statement, "It's going to rain." Secondly, this translation is
accomplished by using the probability range of 0% to 100% to form a
decision dimension, with 100% corresponding to "yes," 0% to "no," and
50% to "I don't know." Intermediate values are ultimately associated
with one of these three anchor or decision points according to a vague
and variable proximity criterion. Thus, 70% is considered sufficiently
above 50% to warrant identification with 100% or "yes" with perhaps some
associated expectation of error.
Given this qualitative (yes/no) interpretation of the probability
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range, 50% is not viewed as a predictive forecast, but as an admission
by the forecaster of total ignorance about the outcome.
S14: ...Anyone can say 50% chance just by looking up in the sky,
If it's cloudy, you can say there's a 50% chance of rain.
S9: Well, it's not 100% chance, and it's not 50/50, so he's not
guessing. I don't know. If he said 50/50 chance I'd think
that was kind of strange.
I: What would it mean if he said 50/50?
S9: I guess I would think that he didn't really know what he was
talking about, because only 50/50—"it might rain or it
might be sunny, I really don't know," you know. It's kind
of weird
.
I: So when he says 70%
—
S9: 70—well. Sounds like he's saying, "The likelihood is that
it's going to be rain, but then it might be—the clouds
might clear up tomorrow or something like that, so it might
change .
"
In Table 3, responses are noted which are indicative of subjects'
having translated probabilities into qualitative decisions. Using
probabilities to arrive at decisions in this way, however, does not
necessarily imply that the meaning of the values as probabilities is not
also available. A frequentist or personalist might hear the statement,
"There is a 70% chance of rain today," and conclude that they had better
take an umbrella. But they would know that if they looked at the record
of those days for which a similar prediction was made, on approximately
70% of them it would have rained. One of the probes used in the Weather
problem inquired about the accuracy of a forecaster who had predicted
70% chance of rain for ten days, when in fact, no rain was recorded on
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three of the ten days. According to probability theory, the proportion
of rain to no-rain days is perfectly consistent with the 70% forecast
that was made on each day. Three of the subjects' responses were
consistent with this reasoning. Nine of the subjects, however, felt
that the forecaster was only "pretty accurate," suggesting that there
was room for improvement. Two examples are provided below.
S10: Well, out of the ten days there was 70%—seven of them it
did rain, three of them it didn't. I would say he was
pretty accurate. I don't know about perfect.
S12: I'd say it was pretty good—only three misses out of ten
days. I would tend to trust his judgment more than if
someone missed seven out of ten
—
got three right.
These subjects seemed to regard the days it rained as "hits" and the
days it didn't rain as "misses." Since the forecaster was only right on
seven of the days rather than on all ten, he was only "pretty accurate."
Presumably this is the case because in the outcome approach the 70% has
meaning only in relation to the particular day for which the forecast
was made, and the objective is to predict the outcome on that day.
All but one of the nine subjects were also asked what should have
been predicted on the days it didn't rain. In every case, subjects
responded that the percentage given should have been lower than the 70%,
and usually lower than 50%. This implies that on the days it didn't
rain, the prediction of a 70% chance of rain was incorrect. Thus, this
is an additional instance of evaluating a prediction as either right or
wrong once the results of the trial are known.
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S10: Well, out of the ten days there was 70%-seven of them itdid ram, three of them it didn't. I would say he was
pretty accurate. 1 don't know about perfect.
I: What should he have predicted on the days it didn't
rain?
S10 Probably 30% chance or less that it would rain
S12: Well, he could either have said that there's a chance that
it might rain rather than being more definite, or just said
"mild," you know, "some clouds," or something like that
rather than being specific.
S15: That he had a high probability of predicting rain, because
out of ten predictions, only three went to the low odds.
I: What would have happened if he had been perfectly accurate?
S15: Well, then he'd be really—chances he'd be really good.
I:
.
— What should he have predicted on the days it didn't
rain?
S15: A lower probability of rain. Instead of saying 70%, 50%--or
whatever. Maybe he did the probabilities wrong or maybe
that's just the way it happened.
It would appear that for these subjects, the meaning of 70% as a
probability is completely dominated by its use as a value to arrive at a
decision of rain
.
Evidence for the decision and single-trial features has been
offered in this section without attempting to separate subject
statements which are suggestive of one feature and not of the other.
This is because yes/no predictions in every case have referred to single
trials. That the single-trial feature is a separate component, however,
is suggested by subject responses to the probe inquiring about the
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accuracy of a forecasters' predictions over ten trials. Responses to
the effect that the forecaster was pretty accurate suggest that these
subjects are evaluating accuracy by focusing on the results of each
individual trial, then summing over trials to get an overall level of
accuracy. In this case perfect accuracy would entail correct
predictions on every day. Two of the subjects' protocols offer strong
support for this interpretation. In attempting to resolve their own
conflicting views as to whether the forecaster was perfect or pretty
acccurate, they focused on the question of whether the individual day,
or all ten days, was the appropriate unit of analysis.
S8: Well, he's looking at an individual day—particular day—and
he's setting up a percentage on one day. And you can't
really extend that to an amount of time, I don't think.
S11: ...they didn't predict a ten-day span; they predicted each
individual day. So it seems as though when each day comes
up it's a whole in itself, and it's not necessarily put
together in a unit.
In this section the outcome approach has been described as being
motivated by the desire to predict outcomes. This is in contrast to the
objective of interpretations based on a formal theory of probability, .
Formal theories provide a system for estimating the probability that
some outcome obtains given some chance set-up. Predictions for
individual trials or a series of trials may be viewed as logically
flowing from these probabilities. However, in most cases the outcome of
an individual trial provides little information concerning the accuracy
of the probability estimate on which it was based. In the outcome
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approach, one determines whether or not an outcome will occur and
associated numeric values gauge a person's confidence in the prediction.
If the outcome occurs as predicted, the predictor was right; if not, the
predictor was wrong and the numerically expressed confidence was
incorrectly arrived at. When probabilities are provided, as in the
Weather problem, the outcome-oriented individual does not interpret them
as probabilities per se, but as values which can be used to partition a
decision space into yes, no, or I-don't-know decision regions.
Predicting Outcomes From Causes
In this subsection it will be argued that outcome-oriented
individuals arrive at predictions through consideration of factors that
would cause or bring about an outcome. Thus, the outcome approach will
be portrayed as involving a causal as opposed to a chance interpretation
of uncertain events, the latter being characteristic of formal
probabilistic reasoning. A few comments about how uncertainty is viewed
within a formal framework will help clarify the distinction between
causal and chance explanations.
First, it needs to be stressed that a formal probabilistic approach
does not necessitate the denial of underlying causal mechanisms in the
case of chance events. Hypothetically , one can imagine describing the
last in a series of 100 tosses of a fair coin in sufficient detail such
that it could be seen to be determined by events which preceeded it.
Certainly, its position on the back of a hand, say, was determined by
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its orientation in the hand in which it landed, which was determined by
its position in the air the instant before landing, which ultimately was
determined by the way in which the toss was executed, which, in turn,
was determined by events including the previous toss, and so on. m
this analysis, successive trials would be seen not as independent, but
as dependent elements in a causal sequence. And as Venn (1 962) states,
a theory of probability "makes no assumptions whatever about the way in
which events are brought about, whether by causation or without it"
(P. 236).
In practice, however, a causal description is often seen as
impractical if not impossible:
It is a pure illusion to think that the motion of the balls on
Galton's Board can be given a 'causal* explanation by means of
the differential equations of classical mechanics,
because.
. .these equations can be said to determine
unambiguously the course taken by a ball. And if we try to
arrive at a better understanding of the motions by applying
more and more exact experimental methods, we shall soon find
ourselves in new difficulties Instead of finding
something which... is more simple than the original phenomenon,
we arrive at phenomena that are more and more complex, (von
Mises, 1957, p. 208-209)
Accepting a current state of limited knowledge, a probabilistic
approach adopts a "black-box" model according to which underlying causal
mechanisms, if not denied, are ignored. Abandoning a specific,
mechanistic analysis of cause and effect, a chance model gains its power,
from observations related to the fact that regularities occur over
series of trials independent of specific causal agents. As will be
illustrated in this subsection, a mechanistic model is not abandoned in
the outcome approach. The goal of predicting the results of individual
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trials in a yes/no fashion would, in fact, seem to imply the possibility
of determining beforehand the results of each individual trial. This
could only be accomplished through an analysis of the appropriate causal
mechanisms
.
I will first discuss the Weather problem in which some subjects
believe that the probability of rain is arrived at directly by measuring
factors associated causally with rain, such as humidity, barometric
pressure, and cloud cover. Next I will discuss the Bone problem in
which several subjects apparently generated predictions and associated
confidence values by attempting to analyze the features of the bone and,
in cases, the rolling technique which would bring about (cause)
different outcomes. Finally I will discuss the Misfortune problem in
which subjects asked to account for the co-occurrence of several
low-frequency events relied on causal explanations that involve, for
example, imbedding the events into a causal-linear schema where each
event but the first can be seen as a direct result of a preceding event.
Weather problem
. In the Weather problem subjects were asked to
explain what the specific number in the proposition "70J chance of rain
tomorrow" means. Three types of interpretations were given by subjects.
Three of the subjects (1, 11, 14) suggested that the number may be a
measure of the confidence of the forecaster that it will rain tomorrow,
though none of these subjects was clear about how the specific number
was chosen
.
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I: What does the specific number, in this case the 70% tell
you?
81: It would tell me that the weather forecaster thinks it's
going to rain, but isn't certain. Because, say I got a testback and I got a 70. I knew enough to get a C but not
enough to really do well.... I guess they just look at the
kind of weather drifting into the area, but there's always a
chance that it will veer off or something.
811: ...just from conditions, I guess—from the atmosphere and
from variables. I guess the weather is just like a lot of
problems where you're looking at a whole bunch of variables
and as they come together in one situation If you look
out and see clouds here and they're so high up, and there's
moisture here—then it kind of adds up to a likelihood that
it will do something, and maybe the 70% is—maybe when they
say that it has something to do with how sure they are that
it's going to happen, I don't know.
Four of the subjects (2, 4, 5, 6) interpreted the 70% in a way that
is consistent with a frequency interpretation, though as indicated in
the excerpt from Subject 2, not necessarily in accord with accepted
convention
.
S2: It means that 70% of the area to which the broadcast is
being given will experience precipitation.
I: Where did they get the specific number?
S4: I'd say a combination of current data and past records
—
just
trends and any kind of history of the behavior of whatever
data they have
.
Three of the subjects (3, 9, 5, the latter having also given a
frequentist account) suggested that the 70% was a measure of the
presence of factors that would produce rain.
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X: How do they arrive at that specific number?
S3: They must use their equipment to measure moisture and
clouds. I don't know how it works at all, but it's fairly
accurate—they must know what they're doing.
S5: What it means is they can see all these cloud patterns
forming and moving into a particular area, but they're not
as dense as, say, a hurricane where you can absolutely
predict where it's going to go. 100%—that means it was a
total cloud thing coming over the area.
S9: I guess he means that there's not a 100% chance, but the
likelihood is that it's going to be a 70% chance of rain, I
guess. Maybe it means that there's 70% humidity in the air,
I don't know. I'd say the likelihood is that it might not
rain that much, or something
—
just a little bit.
Though Subject 12 was not clear about what she thought the 70%
specifically referred to, she responded to another probe which indicated
that she may have a tendency to interpret probability values as measures
of causal factors.
I: If you heard a statement like, "A person's chances of dying
before the age of 40 are 25%," what would the 25% mean to
you?
S12: Twenty five in that case would mean to me that the outside
possibility, in other words, 25% would be the disease or
whatever would happen to the person in order to make them
ill or to the point where they would die, I think.
I: Can you say just a little more about that?
S12: I guess 25% would mean the consequences that would bring
about someone dying before the age of 40.
I: Uh-huh. So 25% now reflects—What happens 25% of the time?
Or 25%—
S12: Is the frequency of occurrence, I guess. Something that
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would bring about death-like a disease or maybe hereditaryfactors or something. y
Interpreting the 70% as a measure of the presence of causal factors
is consistent with regarding the occurrence of no rain as a mistake
rather than as an event that had a 30% chance of occurring. Either the
forecaster made an error in measuring or interpreting the factors or, as
three subjects suggested, the factors were altered after they were
measured
.
S8: I wouldn't think he'd goofed. I'd just think that for some
reason or other, the atmosphere didn't—there wasn't a very
predictive forecast. Weather changes a lot, you know
S9: Well, that it probably was correct at the time that he said
it, but by the time it went out it probably wasn't really
correct
.
S12: Well, that maybe they just fouled up. Or during the night
the precipitation, or something, changed in a different
direction, because of other outside factors.
Bone problem
.
Whereas the Weather problem provided the opportunity
to see how subjects interpreted a probability expressed as a percentage,
the Bone problem permitted the study of how subjects arrive at initial
predictions under conditions of uncertainty and how they generate a
number when asked how likely they think it is that their prediction will
occur. It also provided the opportunity to explore how initial
predictions are modified as new information is acquired. As in the
Weather problem, excerpts from subject interviews which are consistent
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with either a freqentist or outcome approach will be provided. Several
subjects will be described as having turned to a causal analysis of the
bone in attempting to answer the question. In this analysis, rather
than relying on the results of previous trials, the prediction and
associated confidence is obtained from an inspection of features of the
bone, such as its surface area, which would tend to cause the bone to
land one way as opposed to another. Before turning to a discussion of
this tendency, however, some observations are in order concerning how
subjects responded in general to the request to determine the side most
likely to land upright.
Subjects were presented with the bone, but were told not to roll it
before making an initial guess as to which side was most likely to land
upright. Subjects, for the most part, seemed to regard this as a
reasonable request. Two subjects, however, responded in a way
characteristic of a frequentist, both feeling that they could not really
say anything without first rolling the bone.
S2: I don't think I could tell you without rolling it a few
times.— This is not like a die, and I think that there is
no way of me knowing personally without doing
experimentation
.
S14: Predict? I couldn't 'cause I don't know which side is—It's
like rolling a weighted die. You have to know the
probability first. I don't know the probability.
I: Why don't you go ahead and roll it and see what happens.
S14: That doesn't matter, 'cause any of them could come up.
After subjects had made an initial prediction and had rolled the
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bone, they were asked if rolling the bone more times would be of further
help in determining which side was most likely. For the frequentist,
this question verges on silliness, the answer being all too obvious.
S1: Oh definitely. I mean that's the only way I could tell for
sure. I mean I could be totally wrong. I think the only
way with a thing like this is to just keep rolling it andjust record the results and somehow formulate which one
would be the most likely to land on.
Consistent with this frequency interpretation, the majority of
subjects used the information obtained from several rolls of the bone to
modify their initial prediction such that the most frequently rolled
side was believed to be the most likely. When shown results from 1000
trials, they also revised their conclusion, if necessary, and relied
more heavily on the rolls from the 1000 trials then on their own
observations when asked to predict the results of ten trials.
A number of responses, however, were inconsistent with a frequency
interpretation. Five subjects (as noted in Table 4, Appendix A)
expressed reservations about whether additional trials would be helpful
in determining which side was most likely. Three subjects did not use
the data provided from the results of 1000 trials in predicting the
results of 10 trials. Eight subjects attributed variations among trials
to the way the bone was rolled. Three protocols are reproduced below.
These subjects seemed to believe that in answering the question
concerning which side is most likely, more reliable information could be
obtained from careful inspection of the bone than from rolling it, and
that, in some cases, rolling it might even provide misinformation.
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I: Would rolling it more help?
S6: Probably.
I: Why don't you roll it as may times as you like?
S6: [Rolls B.C.A] This isn't helping me any. [Rolls B]
I: When you say this isn't helping you any—?
S6: Just 'cause all those sides are coming up. [Rolls B.D.C] Ididn't think that—[Rolls E] See, I didn't think that would
ever show up, just because I didn't think it would standlike that. I'm surprized that it doesn't show B or D more
LRolls A] than it's showing. [Rolls A] I think I probablylooked at the rock in a different way. I think the shape iskind of deceiving, so that I didn't realize it would stand
up in so many different sides.... [While setting the bone
on its various sides] I still think that, I don't know, it
seems to stand the best on B and D really.
I: Do you have any idea of which side has come up most in the
times you've rolled it?
S6: Well, B and D came up twice. A came up about three times,
and C came up once. I don't think E or F ever came up.
They don't really stand too well. [Actual results,
including an initial D, were 3A, 3B, 2C, 2D, E] So I guess A
is another side that comes up pretty often. But A and B are
kind of—if it just rolled over once more it would go to B
[Turns bone over from B to A] . So it would still make me
think that B would be more prone to go than A, 'cause when
it's showing up A it's not as sturdy as when it goes to B.
I: How many times would you want to roll that before you were
absolutely confident about which side was most likely?
S6: Probably about 50 times. You could really calculate even
100 I guess you need to really be sure. But still, I don't
know. That doesn't seem to help me that much because it
could just be, you know. If you rolled it 100 times it
could show up on D every other time, and then the next 100
times you do it, it could be different results. So I don't
know how much that would show either .
Heavy reliance on beliefs about the stability of various sides of
the bone helped this subject maintain the correct belief that D or B
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were most likely to land upright despite the fact that the lifted
frequency data she had obtained suggested otherwise. This tendency is
justifiable within a personalist theory of probability. However,
inconsistent with any established interpretation, she also was uncertain
that rolling the bone would eventually provide more reliable information
than simple inspection of the bone. Subject 9f whose protocol follows,
similarly did not believe that rolling the bone would provide the needed
information, nor does she feel capable of properly analyzing the bone. .
Rather, she believes that to appropriately answer the question, the bone
must be analyzed by someone more mathematically sophisticated than she.
I: If you were to roll that, which side do you think would mostlikely land upright?
S9-: Wow. If I was a math major, this would be easy.
S9:
....Boy, this is hard. Yeah, I think D. But then again, B
is very uneven which takes away from—But D is nice andflat, so if D fell down, B would be up. I'd go with B I
think.
I: OK. And about how likely do you think B is? B to come up?
S9: I couldn't even judge. I mean, my opinion is that it would
be a little more likely than the others—just because the
surface of D. But otherwise, I wouldn't say it's much more
likely. It depends on the roll, I think. Probably.
S9:
....[Rolls C] C. So it was the the other surface. Well,
it's kind of similar to the other sides I said.... So, I
guess it could land on any of them. I don't know if you can
determine something like that. Maybe you can
with—mathematically
. But I don't know.
I: How would you determine it mathematically?
S9: I guess you would because of the weights and stuff. However
they do it. I know that some people have dice that are
weighted down in certain numbers. And I suppose if they
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I:
figured that out mathematically—which was more
weighted—and figure surface structure.
....Would rolling it more times help you decide which side
was most likely?
S9: No. I don't know. I think it's difficult to decide which
side is more likely. I don't see how you really can, justby looking at it. That's my opinion.
I: Why don't you roll it a few times and see what happens?
S9: [Rolls A,B,D,A,D,E,D,E,D,B,E,B]
I: What do you conclude having rolled it a few times?
S9: Well, I still think the possibilities are pretty even. I
should have really counted out how many times each different
surface hit.
I: That would help you?
S9: Probably. But... it seemed pretty even It wasn't more,
one or the other, except for it was less E.
I: How many times would you have to roll that before you could
be real confident about which, if any, was most likely?
S9: Oh, probably quite a few times. Like maybe 20.
After showing her the results of 1000 rolls she concluded that B, C and
D were most likely. Then she was asked,
I: Would you conclude from looking at that [1000 results] that
D is more likely than B?
S9: [Sets the bone with D, then B up, then looks at the results]
Oh, yeah. Well, if the percentages are there, yep.
She used the data from 1000 rolls to predict the results of 10 rolls,
but began to doubt the frequencies after she had rolled 2A, 1B, 1D, and
3C After she had completed the ten rolls, rolling two more Ds and a B,
she believed the statistics were "correct" but suggested that if it were
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rolled another 1000 times "that it might be totally different." If she
were to roll it another ten times she said that she would use her
previous results on the last 10 rolls in preference to the data from
1000 rolls.
The response of Subject 12 to the Bone problem provides the most
extreme example of someone maintaining a belief based on the physical
properties of the bone, despite frequency data which runs contrary to
her belief.
I: If you were to roll that, which side do you think would land
upright?
S12: ...I think B would be up D looks like it has four fairly
flat corners. Then I could be totally wrong.
I: How likely is it that B will come up?
S12: I'd give it about a 75% chance.
S12:
....[Rolls a B] Ha. What do you know.
I: What do you conclude about your prediction?
S12: I guess my reasoning is somewhere on the ball. I think if
you inspect things you can understand them, or if you
question things, you can understand them better than if you
just go ahead and make some free decision about something.
I: What do you conclude from having rolled it once?
S12: That my prediction was just about on the nose.
I: Would rolling it more help you decide which side was most
likely?
S12: I don't know. I'm pretty sure about my prediction. But
just for the fun of it I could do it
—
you know, just
curiosity sake.
S12: .[Rolls D] Uh-oh.
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I: "Uh-oh" what?
S12: It landed on the opposite side.
I: So what does that make you think?
S12: That there's more than one possible answer to something—to
this problem.
S12: ....[Rolls D, C] Oh. Well, I'm getting a little frustrated.
'Cause when you first get something right you're really
happy about it But then when it turns out another way,
well, that's OK too. But it starts to make you a little
shaky. Now that this has happened—the third a C—well, I'm
beginning to think this rock is quite equal all around.
I: So by "equal all around"—what do you mean?
S12: That it could be stable landing on any of the sides. It's
just a matter of, sort of, chance, maybe.
I: ...Any idea of which side is most likely to come up? Or is
there one that is more likely than the others?
S12: Well, I think D, C or B are more likely than E or F. Then I
could be wrong.
I: That's on the basis of—How do you know that?
S12: Well, E and F have less of a mass around them. [Rolls
C.D.B.B] Yeah. I think I'll go along with that last
statement
.
I: D, C or B?
S12: Yeah.
I: And do you think one of those—D, C or B—is more likely
than the other two?
S12: Yeah. C.
I: Why?
S12: I don't know. The top part—it looks most stable because
it's like a pyramid shape. The bottom is very thick and
long.... It has all that base under it.
I: Would rolling that a lot more times help you, in any way,
decide which side was most likely to come up—whether C was
most likely?
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S12: I don't think so.
S12: [Referring to data from 1000 rolls] So D
likely
.
you found most
..Would you feel safe in concluding looking at this, thatis, in fact, more likely than B?
I: What is your belief about which side is
come up if you rolled it?
most likely to
S12: I have to look at this again. It changed shape in the pastfew minutes. [Inspects bone] I still think C.
The above excerpts indicate, as previously suggested, that some
subjects believe that the answer to the Bone problem is to be found in
an inspection of those physical properties of the bone that would cause
it to land in various orientations. The excerpts also indicate that the
subjects are uncertain, to varying degrees, whether the results from
previous rolls are useful in making inferences about the relevant
dispositions of the bone. It might be that they distrust frequency data
because they can seem so variable, whereas the characteristics of the
bone that cause it to land as it does are viewed as invariable. This
may explain why many subjects chose to attribute variability among
trials to the specific way in which the bone was rolled rather than to
view variability as a predictabile feature of a chance set-up. The
"rolling hypothesis" was used by subjects both to explain differences
between their data and the results of 1000 rolls, as indicated above,
and also to explain variations in their own results. As an example of
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the latter type, Subject 5 had previously rolled B.B.D.C.D.C.D having
initially predicted B.
I: What are you thinking about?
S5: I'm thinking that I threw it differently the first two
times—that these times I'm throwing it from a higher
height. [Rolls D] Now if I try it lower [Rolls D] it's
still D. Now I wonder what I—[Rolls B] There's a B[Rolls C] Now there's a C.
Another possible, and more basic, explanation for subjects'
distrust of frequency data is that they may view them as a secondary and
thus less reliable type of information when compared to the physical
properties of the bone. Frequency data do not precede or cause the
properties of the bone; rather, properties cause the frequency data.
These subjects may feel that if one wants to predict what will happen on
a next roll or series of rolls, they must predict with knowledge about
those factors that would cause various outcomes. While frequency data
reflect those causal factors, they are themselves not causal. Both the
next outcome and the accumulation of past outcomes are products of the
same causes—the properties of the bone and the way in which it is
rolled .
Misfortune problem
. Explaining the Misfortune problem by
attributing the co-occurrence of the four events, or at least three of
them, to chance is in accordance with a frequency interpretation. Eight
of the subjects responded in this way. The protocol of Subject 2 in the
prototype interview (Table 2) is a good example of the reasoning these
subjects provided. Five other subjects offered a chance account of the
Misfortune problem as one possible explanation but suggested other
explanations as well, Tnree general types of alternative explanations
were offered: a) the attribution of "bad luck" to the person involved,
b) the belief that some external force such as God or the stars caused
the events, and c) the belief that the four events were causally
connected such that one event triggered the next in the sequence of
events. Subjects who offered two or more explanations typically did not
state a preference among them. The exception was Subject 14 who
preferred a chance to a causal-linear explanation. Table 4 summarizes
the nature of the explanations that were offered by each subject. A few
protocols illustrating the use of different types of explanations are
provided below. (The protocol reproduced in the prototype interview is
an example of both the casual-linear and external-force explanation.
The latter was in the form of the belief that bad things pile up,
eventually forcing themselves into one's life.)
Though several subjects had mentioned the possible explanation that
the person had bad luck, they immediately dismissed it as implausable.
Only Subject 3 seriously considered it as an explanation.
S3: Has he always had bad luck or were things normal till this
day pretty much?
S3: 1 don't know why some people are lucky or some people
are unlucky. That's the way it is though. And if he'd
always had bad luck, you could almost expect something like
that. And if he hasn't, if he'd been normal, then I don't
know—weird
.
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Subject 5 showed a strong preference for establishing a
causal-linear connection among the events, going so far as to reorder
the events in a way that would make such a connection more feasable. He
then seemed to dismiss a "cause-and-effect" account only to consider it
again. He dismissed an external-force explanation and seems in the last
sentence to have preferred his "cause and effect" account.
S5: Well, what caused what?
S5: I'm trying to figure out if the order you gave me was
the order that they happened, or if his father died or he
went out to a restaurant with his parents—with his family
to a fast food place, and they got food poisoning, and
because he was sick, while he was driving he smashed up the
car. His father died in the accident, and he was on his way
to work so he was late.
I: [Repeated correct order of events]
S5: Things happen and there's no cause and effect going on which
makes all these things happen at once. It just happened
that way. There's no cosmic stars making it all happen.
Just these things happen to people. His father may have
died as a result of a heart attack from hearing the news
that his son had a tragic accident....
S5: ...You can't find you future in the stars. I mean, it's
very clear, if you turn left what's going to happen is left;
if you turn right—voila. If you study physics all your
life, you're going to become a physicist—Well, you could
become a garbage collector, but the likelihood is
—
Subject 13 seemed fairly confident that the events described in the
Misfortune problem were a result of a divine force, though she does not
feel that this is true of all events.
S13: I'm a strong believer in God—I'm very religious. So I just
believe that when something happens like that... it
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just—like, "All right, this is the situation that's
supposed to happen to me today. I got to handle it the best
I can." But if it's something I know I screwed up
on... then it's like it was my fault.
I: If someone said it was just coincidence, how would you feel
about an explanation like that?
S13: I believe in coincidence, but not as much as I would believe
that things are done for a reason, like, or things are done
for a purpose. So I don't know if I'd say that that was a
coincidence
.
Though the three non-chance explanations differ in many respects,
they all are types of causal explanations in the sense that they
describe some condition that existed prior to one or more of the events
and that produced and thus explains their co-occurrence. This tendency,
to look to the antecedents of events both as a source of explanation and
as a basis for prediction, is evident in all three of the interview
problems. Predictions based on the frequency of past occurrence of an
event are, in cases, consciously shunned.
Later I will discuss the functional value of causal interpretations
of probabilistic phenomena and elaborate in more detail the difference
between the frequentist and outcome-oriented views of chance events.
What has been argued so far is that subjects have a strong tendency to
look for and base predictions of future events on causal agents, even in
cases where a "more educated" view would abandon such an approach in
favor of a probabilistic (non-causal) analysis. While a statistician
would likely accept some deterministic, and therefore causal,
explanation for many chance events (e.g., flipping a coin), these
explanations would be viewed as not particularly useful in some
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circumstances in that the causal explanation is overwhelming complex and
practically unknowable. For this reason the "black-box" approach would
be regarded as providing a more useful model for understanding.
Furthermore, values associated with a prediction which is based on the
explication of causes are apt to be a gauge of the person's confidence
that the predicted outcome will occur. The value also seems to be
interpreted as a measure of the strength of or degree to which causes
are present.
In the next section the interrelationships among the three features
of the outcome approach will be explored in an attempt to show that they
may be regarded as interactive components of an informal approach to
probability.
Coherence of the Outcome Approach
In the previous section the outcome approach was introduced and
described as consisting of the single-trial, decision, and causal
features. Excerpts were offered both in support of the validity of
these features and to show how they are logically connected and thus can
be considered core components of an informal approach to probability.
However, the development of logical connections among the features is a
necessary but not sufficient step in demonstrating their
interrelatedness. In this section, two types of empirical data which
could provide evidence of the interrelatedness of the features will be
presented. First, the degree to which aspects of the features a) are
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consistent across problems and b) cluster together in subject protocols
will be estimated by calculating relevant correlation coefficients. The
first set of correlations provide an estimate of how reliable the
features are. These correlations address the question, for example, of
whether a subject who makes an evaluative (right/wrong) response in the
Bone problem is more likely to make a similar response in the Weather
problem. The second set of correlations address the question of whether
the features occur together such that, for example, a subject who adopts
a causal approach to determining a probability is more likely to make an
evaluative response in the context of the occurrence of a predicted
outcome
.
The second source of empirical evidence will involve further
qualitative analysis of the interviews. This analysis will focus on
four protocols from the Weather problem in which the relations among the
features and their incompatability with a frequency interpretation are
especially apparent.
Correlations Within and Among Features
Within features . It was possible to determine the consistency of
the causal feature across all three of the problems. However, the only
other response-type that occurred in more than one problem was the
evaluation of predictions which was observed in both the Weather and
Bone problems.
Scores for the evaluative response in the Bone problem were
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generated by scoring 2 points if subjects made at least one statement to
the effect that their prediction was right or wrong. In the case of the
Weather problem, corresponding scores were generated by scoring a) 2
points if subjects said that the forecaster was wrong having predicted
rain when, in fact, it did not rain, and b) 2 points if the 7-out-of-10
correct predictions were regarded as "pretty accurate" or 1 point if
subjects were undecided between the "pretty accurate" and "perfect"
evaluation. (See Table 3.)
Scores for the causal feature in the Bone problem ranged from 0 to
4, 1 point being scored for each category that was checked in Table 4.
Corresponding scores for the Weather and Misfortune problems ranged from
0 to 2. For the Weather problem, 1 point was scored for each category
that was checked in Table 4. For the Misfortune problem, a score of 0
indicated that only a chance explanation had been given or had been
preferred to a non-chance explanation; 1 if both a chance and causal
explanation were given but no preference was expressed for the former;
and 2 points if only causal explanations were given.
Product-moment correlations were calculated and the significance of
the values were evaluated using one-tailed t-tests. The correlation
between the evaluative responses in the Bone and Weather problems was r
= .423 which, however, was not significantly different from 0.
Correlations among the causal features were: Bone-Weather r = .634,
p<.005; Bone-Misfortune r = .477t P<-05; Weather-Misfortune r = .460,
p<.05.
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Among features. As has been mentioned, in the analysis of the
interviews, the decision and single-trial features were not analyzed or
coded separately since their co-occurrence was virtually perfect.
Accordingly, the correlations which are examined in this section are
those among the a) evaluative and b) yes/no predictions associated with
the decision feature and c) the causal feature. Scores for the
among-feature comparisons were obtained by combining the features scores
of the individual problems. The evaluation-of
-prediction scores ranged
from 0 to 6, the scores for the Bone and Weather problems having been
added together. For the causal feature, the scores on the Weather,
Misfortune, and Bone problems were added together, giving a possible
range of from 0 to 8. The yes/ no prediction scores were based only on
performance in the Weather problem. They ranged from 0 to 3, 1 point
being scored for each category checked in Table 3.
Product-moment correlations were calculated and evaluated as in the
wi thin-feature analyses. The causal and evaluative responses were
highly correlated (r = .762, p<.0005). The yes/no predictions and
causal responses were also related (r = .443, p<.05). However, the
yes/no predictions and evaluative reponses did not prove to be
significantly related (r = .275).
Considering the restricted sample size and the. fact that the
feature scores were based on very few criteria, the correlational
analyses provide evidence which suggests that, as a whole, the features
as decribed are both consistent across problems and cluster together in
subject protocols.
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However, even strong correlational evidence that the features are
consistent and cluster together would not necessarily demonstrate that
they are core components of an informal approach to probability. It may
be that they are common but unrelated notions held by those who are
unfamiliar with formal probability theory, and their co-occurrence
simply reflects this lack of formal instruction. What must be shown is
that they not only cluster together, but that they are imbedded in a
logical system which has an ontological status on par with a formal
theory of probability. This demonstration is attempted in the following
section
.
Analysis of Conflicts
In this section the performance of four subjects on the Weather
problem will be further examined. These subjects, as was previously
mentioned, expressed conflicting ways of interpreting the question of
the accuracy of a forecaster who had predicted 70% chance of rain for
ten days, three days of which it did not rain. According to one
perspective, the forecaster was perfectly accurate. However, from an
alternative, and to some a more compelling viewpoint, perfect accuracy
would have entailed rain on all ten days. At the heart of this conflict
is the question of whether the forecaster is trying to formulate a) an
accurate prediction of the relative frequency of rainy days, or b) a
decision about whether or not it will, in fact, rain. The former
objective is consistent with a formal approach to probability; the
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latter has been described as the primary objective of the outcome
approach to probability. That subjects who entertain both of these
perspectives experience conflict suggests that the two perspectives are
of similar ontological status—that the outcome approach is an
alternative system for dealing with uncertainty.
In the protocol of Subject 5 all three of the outcome approach
features are explicitly mentioned. This subject had initially given a
causal interpretation of the meaning of 70*. He evidenced some
confusion when asked what he would conclude if it did not rain on a day
for which 70% chance of rain had been forecast. At this point he
constructed a very accurate frequentist account, drawing on the use of
the frequency data in the Bone problem to help him think about the
Weather problem:
S5: In the same way that I used that [refers to 1000 data] to
predict here [results of 10 trials]. They have years and
years of back-log information—radar pictures—that they
keep updating and they say this pattern has this...X%, X
number of times it's become this....
By the time the accuracy probe was interjected , he had given both a
statistical and a causal interpretation to the 70%. His first response
to the probe was consistent with a frequency interpretation. But
immediately he verbalized an opposing "intuition" according to which 70%
was interpreted as meaning that it's going to rain. It is clear that he
views these as incompatable interpretations, and he eventually reverts
to the causal view:
S5: He was absolutely on the dot, because it was a 70% chance of
63
rain and... it was accurate—seven days it was, three days it
wasn't. That's seven out of ten—that's 70%. But generally
when they say 70% chance of rain, that means—"70% of thetime we've seen this, it's happened." I don't know, I justhave this intuition that they mean more than—that the 70%
means something other than just seven out of ten days it
will rain. But I don't know what it means. I just know
that if I saw 70% chance of rain, I'd wear a rain coat the
next day, and I would probably be right.
I: Any idea of what, in addition, that's communicating, other
than seven out of ten days it will rain?
S5: OK. Well it must have something to do with cloud formation
or—there are a lot of things that are involved in weather.
There's the barometric pressure, the atmosphere .. .the
temperature.
. .
.
In terms of the outcome approach, the logic of this subject's
argument is as follows: Seventy percent means more than that it will
rain 70% of the time—it means it will rain (yes/no predicting) and the
prediction is probably right (evaluation of the prediction). Given that
70% can be interpreted as "rain," it must be derived from a measure of
factors that produce (cause) rain rather than from frequency data. As
was suggested earlier, this latter belief may be based on the notion
that since frequency data do not cause rain, they cannot be used to
predict rain.
Similar to Subject 5, Subject 6 had previously given a frequency
interpretation of 70% chance of rain. When given the accuracy probe,
however, her response was that the forecaster was "pretty good." Asked
what would have happened if the forecaster had been perfectly accurate,
she responded:
S6: Then it would have rained every day. I guess when they say
70% chance, they're only saying a chance. But they still
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predicted that there'd be rain just because there was that
chance for it. You know, it wasn't like a 20% chance ofram, where they would have predicted that there would be no
rain, even though there was that small chance.
I: So on the days it didn't rain, what should the weather
forecaster have predicted?
S6: You know, a lower chance of rain. I can understand if they
predicted a 60% chance and it still didn't rain, 'cause
there's still 40% that it wouldn't rain. But they should—
I
would think it would be very difficult to exactly predict
yes or no when they're only 60%. So he should have probably
had something lower than a 70% chance though on the days
that it didn't rain.
I: When you said that it's very difficult when they're
predicting with 60%, what—
?
S6: Yeah, if by their methods they've come to see that there's a
60% chance of rain, it's hard for them to say if there would
be or not. Just 'cause they know that there is a 60% chance
of rain, but they also know that there is a 40% chance of no
rain. So it's hard to say it's going to rain. They can
really just tell you the chances, and you have to predict
for yourself.
This subject verbalizes the difference between a probabilistic
proposition and the prediction of an outcome based on such a
proposition. The distinction is problematic for intermediate values
where the resulting prediction is ambiguous. For more extreme values
like 70%, she regards the prediction as obvious, falling neatly within
the "yes" region of the decision space. Her statement that "exact"
predictions of yes or no cannot be made for intermediate values implies
that unequivocal predictions can be made for more extreme values. Given
this belief, one would be justified in saying that a forecaster had made
a mistake if it did not rain on a day for which a 70% chance of rain had
been assigned.
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Subject 8. in response to the accuracy probe, concluded that the
forecaster was "very accurate," then immediately began to wonder whether
one could look beyond an individual prediction in assessing accuracy in
this instance:
S8: I was just wondering whether—if you're taking a ten day
span and, as you said, three of the days it didn't rain ifthat can really relate to when he's looking at an individualday—that particular day. And I suppose it can if you'relooking at a ten-day span with 70% chance of rain every day
with the same set-up.
When asked if the forecaster could have been any more accurate she
apparently encoded the question as, "Should the forecaster have
predicted higher than 70% chance?" She responded that giving higher
proportions does not imply higher accuracy:
S8: No, I don't think so. No, 'cause when he says there's going
to be 70% chance of rain, he really can't be more— I don't
think he can be more predictive than that. 'Cause that's a
proportion. If he said 50% chance of—that's, you know, not
any more accurate than if he said 70% chance of rain.
I: Saying 50% chance of rain is no more
S8: Yeah.
I: accurate? In terms of what?
S8: I guess, as I said, he must have certain standards to go by
when he picks a chance of rain, and
—
In an attempt to get her to clarify her statements, she was further
probed
:
I: Say he predicted 50% chance of rain on those ten days. What
would have happened if he were a really good forecaster? If
you kept track, what would you expect in terms of the number
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of days it would rain and the number of days it wouldn't
rain?
S8: Actually, you couldn't really expect anything. Because he
is looking at an individual day, 50 and 50%. So let's sayif it rained that day, then he had a—he was—I don't know
'cause you're looking at individual days, really, so it
could have rained all the time, it could have rained not oneday out of ten days, and then it could have been 50/50, like
five days it rained, five days it didn't rain, and he
wouldn't be—and it would be the same, actually. It would
come out the same, I guess, 'cause he is looking at
individual days.
I: Tell me again what would come out the same? If over ten
days it didn't rain at all
—
S8: Yeah, and if it did rain. 'Cause he's looking at a
particular day. And it's 50% chance rain, 50% not. So he
wouldn't be more or less accurate in any of those
situations, I don't think.
The above excerpt seems very confusing until the subject is viewed
as interpreting the 50% in terms of the outcome approach. According to
that view, 50%, as the mid point on a yes/no decision line, means that
anything can happen—rain or no rain. Using this interpretation of 50%
she confirms her conclusion that assessing accuracy over days is
inappropriate since it should make no difference in the 50% situation
what the results are for the ten days. If accuracy were judged
according to the results of ten days, one would expect five days rain
and five days no rain; but this interpretation of accuracy would
contradict the use of 50% as an indicator of "anything-could-happen ."
This reasoning makes her more certain that individual days should be the
unit of analysis, and accordingly, when asked to summarize what she
believed, she responded:
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S8: Well, he's looking at an individual day—particular day—andhe's setting up percentages on one day. And you can't
really extend that to an amount of time, I don't think.
Subject 11 experienced the same dilemma as Subject 6 of not knowing
whether it is appropriate to assess accuracy by summing over days. He
was not able to resolve the dilemma and moved back and forth between
viewpoints in what he called a "logic swirl."
S11: Oh, it seems as though they were pretty much right on
because in the whole of the ten days they were right on
three of the occasions, which would be 30% it didn't rain,
and that's what they kind of predicted, almost. Maybe.
I: Uh-huh. What are you thinking?
S11: Well, 'cause it's like—They didn't predict a ten-day span.
They predicted each individual day. And so it seems as
though when each day comes up, it's a whole in itself and
it's not necessarily put together in a unit.
S11: ....It kind of gets back to the idea that they were pretty
much right getting seven out of ten right. Maybe it's not
fair to judge it that way. Maybe you should just judge each
one. But I guess you can add them together because they're
all the same. They're all like 70%
I: ....Would they have been more accurate had it rained on all
ten of the days? Would that be more impressive to you?
S11: Well, that's weird 'cause it almost seems that—it almost
seems, I don't know.
I: What are you thinking?
S1 1 : Well, I'm thinking that if they go over, it's almost like
they're going over and they're wrong the other way. It's
raining more than they really predicted. But it's not like
they predicted that it would rain on 70% of the days—of the
next ten days. It's like they predicted rain for each day.
And if they were 70% sure... that it was going to rain on
each day... if it rained on more of those days, then as you
increase the number above seven , then they would be less
accurate
.
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I: So you're sort of in a dilemma there?
S11: Yeah. I don't know. It depends.
In this chapter I have constructed an informal approach to
probability according to which subjects' responses to the problems could
be viewed as reasonable. The informal approach has been described as an
outcome approach since the primary objective is to predict what will or
did occur on a particular trial. Arriving at a prediction often
involves an analysis of the presence of factors which would tend to
cause individual outcome alternatives. Numeric values that may be
associated with a prediction are measures of the confidence that the
predicted outcome will occur, as well as measures of the extent to which
causal agents predispose that outcome. When probabilities are given to
the outcome-oriented individual, they are interpreted consistent with
the two characteristics mentioned above and are recoded into a yes/no or
I-don't-know decision according to their distance from the corresponding
values, 100, 0, and 50%.
Testing the Outcome Approach : Some Predictions
In the above discussion I have argued that many people, and to
varying degrees, have an outcome approach to situations involving
uncertain outcomes. The test of the validity of this hypothesis
involved various tests of "internal coherence." First, various
indicators of the outcome approach were found to be highly correlated
both across subjects and problems. Second, analyses of interview
protocols indicated that the characteristic features that were highly
correlated plausibly came from a common source. However, since the
outcome approach was inferred in large part from the same data set, a
stronger test of the validity of the approach seemed desirable. To this
end, I arranged for the same subjects to participate in a second set of
interviews during the following semester. For these follow-up
interviews, four new problems were used to test various predictions
derived from the outcome approach. In this section, the new problems
will be briefly introduced. The problems, along with the predicted
responses, are described below. The predictions state how
outcome-oriented individuals will perform relative to
frequentist-oriented individuals.
Cab Problem
The Cab problem was used to determine the correspondence between
the deterministic approach (cf. Well et al
. , 1981) and two features of
the outcome approach. In the Cab problem, subjects are asked to
estimate the probability that a cab that was involved in a hit-and-run
accident was blue rather than green. They are given the relative number
of blue and green cabs in the city as well as information regarding the
accuracy of a witness who identified the cab as blue. According to the
deterministic approach, some subjects feel that the task in the Cab
problem is not to estimate the probability that the cab was blue, but to
70
determine whether or not it was blue. This corresponds to the
evaluative component of the decision feature and is characterized in the
Cab problem by subjects making statements to the effect, "I think it was
a blue cab," or, "I think the witness was right." These same subjects,
according to Well et al. f more frequently asked if a number was
required, and when they finally gave an answer, it tended to be based on
a "loose" or qualitative interpretation of the source of evidence they
thought relevant. Thus, subjects often stated that the witness was
"pretty good," giving a value near but not identical to the 80% when
asked for the probability that the cab was blue. As argued above in the
description of the outcome approach, this response is evidence of the
tendency to predict in yes/no fashion.
Prediction U Outcome-oriented individuals will more frequently
give those responses described by Well et al. as deterministic in
answering the Cab problem.
Bone-2 Problem
Relatively few subjects (three) were judged in the Bone problem to
have made predictions about rolling the bone from its physical features.
This may have been because, not having expected this response, there
were no probes designed to elicit it. It may also be that (as expressed
by Subject 9) many felt unable to make an educated analysis of the
physical features, though they believe that it is through such an
analysis that probabilities would ultimately be determined. To explore
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this issue, in the Bone-2 problem subjects are asked to predict the
outcome of another ten rolls of the bone, and are given the choice
between making predictions on the basis of frequency data or on the
basis of information related to the physical properties of the bone.
They are also asked how a statistician would determine the probabilities
associated with each surface of the bone.
Prediction 2. Outcome-oriented individuals will more frequently
choose information related to the physical properties of the bone in
making predictions and state that a statistican would use such
properties in determining probabilities.
Painted-die Problem
In the Painted-die problem, a population of five black stones and
one white stone together with a sampling-with-replacement procedure is
described. Subjects are asked to predict whether in six trials it is
more likely to sample six black stones or five black and one white.
According to the outcome approach, the primary task in situations of
uncertainty is to predict the outcome of individual trials. When asked
to predict the overall outcome of a series of trials, the
outcome-oriented individual will not use the fact that there are five
out of six black stones to form an expectation consistent with
probability theory that they will sample, on the average, one white for
every five black stones. Rather than interpreting the 5/6 figure as a
probability which can be used as a basis for prediction, the
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outcome-oriented individual will interpret it in a more qualitative way
as overwhelming evidence for black on each trial. A belief that in
repeated samples they would observe more than five black for every white
is evidence of this qualitative interpretation.
Prediction 3. Outcome-oriented individuals will more frequently
state that in a sample of six stones, it is more likely to get six black
stones than five black stones, and their reasoning will be that there
are so few white. When asked how many white stones they would expect in
60 trials, they will more frequently give a number less than 10. Also,
when actually sampling from the above population, they will give
"probability values" greater than the percent corresponding to 5/6.
Modelling Problem
Subjects are asked in the Modelling problem whether some number of
labeled stones could be put into a container and sampled in a way that
would generate results comparable to rolling the bone. According to the
outcome approach, frequency data are caused by features of the bone. If
the causal features of two processes are different, as they appear to be
in the case of rolling a bone verses drawing stones from a container,
they will believe that it will be reflected in differences in the
frequency data generated by the two processes.
Prediction ±. The outcome-oriented individual will more frequently
state that it is not possible to model the rolling of the bone by
randomly drawing labeled stones from a container.
CHAPTER IV
METHOD: INTERVIEW 2
Subjects
Twelve of the original sixteen subjects returned to participate in
the follow-up interviews. The other four could not be located.
Subjects were offered a choice of either extra course credit or $10.00
for participating. Approximately five months had elapsed between the
first and second set of interviews. Additional math or statistics
instruction that subjects had received during this interval is noted in
Appendix A.
Procedure
Setting
Initial instructions to subjects were nearly identical to those
outlined in Chapter II. Subjects were told that they would be given
several new problems that were similar to the last set in that they
involved predicting outcomes in situations of uncertainty. They were
reminded to "think aloud" and that they could use the pen and paper for
any figuring they might want to do.
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Problems
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Four problems were employed to test the predictions as described in
the previous chapter. The Cab problem had been used in previous
research as earlier noted. The remaining three problems were developed
and then standardized in 14 pilot interviews. All four problems are
presented below in the order they appeared in the interview.
Cab problem
. (Subjects were asked to read the Cab problem
aloud.) "A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at
night. Two cab companies, the Green and the Blue, operate in
the city. You are given the following data:
(i) 85% of the cabs in the city are Green and 15% are
Blue.
(ii) A witness identified the cab as a Blue cab. The
court tested his ability to identify cabs under the
appropriate visibility conditions. When presented with a
sample of cabs (half of which were Blue and half of which were
Green) the witness made correct indentifications in 80% of the
cases and erred in 20% of the cases.
What is the probability that the cab involved in the
accident was Blue rather than Green?" (After subjects give a
numerical response they are asked:) How did you arrive at that
number?
Suppose the information in (i) were reversed such that
85% of the cabs in the city were Blue and 15% were Green. The
witness, as before, identified it as Blue and was 80% correct
in the test situation. In that case, what would you say the
probability was that the cab involved in the accident was
Blue?
Bone-2 problem . Last time you were asked which side of this
bone you thought would most likely land upright. Do you
remember which side you concluded? (The bone is held far
enough away so that the labels can not be read.) I'm going to
ask you the same question again . And to give you something to
base your answer on, I'll offer you any one of the following
pieces of information. (Subject is shown the list as the
interviewer reads the items.)
1-A measure of surface area of each side.
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2-The results of 100 rolls made by 16 people.
3-The results I got in 1000 rolls.
4-A drawing of the bone showing the center of gravity.
5-The bone to look at.
6-The results on your last 10 rolls.
Which one would you like? Why did you chose that? If you
could have a second piece of information, which would you
choose? Why did you choose that? (Subjects are given both
choices unless item 4 has been picked. In that case, they are
told that the drawing is not available, and to pick another
item. The estimate of surface area is in square inches-
A=.028, B=.078, C=.065, D=.l69. E=.018. F=.031. The results
of 100 rolls were: A=7, B=32, C=21, D=35, E=5, F=0.) If you
rolled the bone, which side do you think would most likely
land upright? What is the probability that x will land
upright? (Subjects are asked to predict what they would get
in ten trials, then the trials are conducted as in the first
interview.
)
I have here a six-sided die. Suppose I told you that
there was a possibility that it was loaded—that it had been
altered so that one side was slightly more likely than the
others to come up. Could you determine whether or not it was
loaded? How? Would rolling it help you determine whether it
was loaded? Suppose you rolled it 24 times and got the
following results: (Subject is shown the results as the
interviewer reads them.) 1=5; 2=2; 3=8; 4=2; 5=4; 6=3. What
would you conclude?
In fact, the die is not loaded. Suppose I painted five
of the surfaces black and the other one white. If I rolled
the painted die six times, would I be more likely to get six
blacks or five blacks and one white? If I rolled it 60 times,
how many times would you expect the white surface to come up?
(This probe was originally worded, "On the average, how many
times would you have to draw from the cup until you got a
white?" After the third interview % it was changed to the
present form which was easier for subjects to understand.)
Obviously, I haven't painted the die. But I do have five
black stones and one white one. (The stones were identically
shaped pieces from a board game which subjects had used in a
previous problem in the first set of interviews.) Suppose I
put these in this cup and shook it up really well. Then I
reached in without looking and drew one out, wrote down the
color, replaced it, shook it up again and kept drawing like
that. (This is demonstrated as it is explained.) Would that
be the same as rolling the painted die? If I rolled the die
several times and recorded what I got, and I drew stones and
recorded those results, could you tell from looking at the
results, which I got from rolling the die and which from
drawing stones? I'm going to draw six stones from the cup,
but first ask you to predict what I'll get? (Stones are
sampled, and before shown the results of each trial the
subject is asked to say which color has been drawn/and alsothe probability that it is that color.)
Modelling problem
.
You agreed that we could create a model of
the painted die by drawing stones from a certain cup—that
that would give comparable results. Would there be a similar
way that we could make a model of the bone so that instead of
rolling the bone we could pick something out of a container
and get the same kind of results?
(Subjects are given the following probes successively
until they agree upon a model or reached the end of the list:)
1-How about if we put six stones which have been labeled
A through F in this cup and sampled from it as we did before?
2-Is there some container that I could fill with some
number of lettered stones that would give results similar to
rolling the bone?
3-Suppose we took the bone to a statistician and, however
it is done, the following probabilities were calculated for
each side: (Subjects are shown the list as the interviewer
reads it.) A was 5 out of 100, or 5%; B was 29 out of 100,
29%; C, 24; D, 37; E, 5; and F, 0. So we took a big can and
first put five of these stones which have been labeled A
inside. (A large can and six small containers filled with
labeled stones is produced.) Then we took 29 Bs, 24 Cs, 37
Ds, and 5 Es, and put them in the container also. Then we
shook it up and sampled from it as before. Do you think that
would give results comparable to rolling the bone?
4-Suppose we rolled the bone and, say, we got a B. We
took a stone labeled B and put it in the container. Then we
rolled the bone again, and similarly, whatever we got, we put
the appropriately labeled stone in the container, and we did
that over and over
. Would we reach a point when it would make
no difference if we rolled the bone or drew from the container
we had filled?
(When, and if, subjects agree upon a model of the bone,
they are asked the following questions:) If I rolled the bone
100 times and kept track of what I got, then I drew 100 times
from this can filled with the labeled stones, and I showed you
the results from both, could you tell from looking at the
results, which I got from rolling the bone and which from
drawing from the container? In those 100 trials with the bone
and the container, do you think with one of those I'd be more
likely than with the other to get no Es? Do you think I'd be
more likely with one of those to get more Ds in 100 trials
than with the other?
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Presentation
The problems were presented orally by the interviewer, and in the
order as specified above. The interview format was the same as in the
first set. A complete transcript of the interview with Subject 11 is
included in Appendix C.
The interviews required approximately 40 minutes. Following the
interview, questions about any of the problems in either session were
answered as were questions concerning the purposes and preliminary
findings of the research.
CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION: INTERVIEW 2
Four predictions were made to test the validity of the outcome
approach as described in Chapter III. For the purpose of testing these
predictions, scores based on performance in the second set of interviews
were correlated with an outcome score which summarized subjects'
performance on the first set of interviews. Outcome scores were
generated for each subject by summing their individual feature scores as
described in Chapter III. Outcome scores had a possible range of from 0
to 17, higher scores being indicative of an outcome orientation. For
the 12 subjects who were interviewed on the second occasion, outcome
scores ranged from 0 to 15, with a mean of 6.83 and standard deviation
of 4.39.
Scores related to each of the four predictions were generated by
having two raters independently code each interview. The raters
included myself and a graduate student who was blind both with respect
to the nature of the first set of interviews and to the hypotheses being
tested
.
In this chapter I will consider each of the predictions in turn,
describe the coding and scoring procedures that were used, report
correlations between performance on the two sets of interviews, and
present selected excerpts from the interviews that pertain to the
predictions.
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Prediction 1
^ PPOblem W3S in0luded in »• second set of interviews both
to replicate the findings of Hell et ai . ,,„„, and t0 determlne thg
extent to which responses labeled in their report as "deterministic"
correlate with the outcome-oriented responses on the first set of
interviews.
Performance of subjects on the Cab problem is summarized in Table
5. Appendix A. m accord with the findings of previous research, the
modal response to the Cab problem was 80%. Subjects who gave 80% as the
answer generally expressed the belief that the information concerning
the base rates of green and blue cabs was irrelevant and should
therefore not figure into the answer. Two subjects (6. and 8) argued
that both the witness and base-rate information were important to
consider and gave estimates of the probability that were intermediate
between the 15$ and 80* (.60 in both cases). Tnese results are in basic
agreement with those reported by Well et al
.
It was predicted that outcome-oriented subjects, as definded by
higher outcome scores on the first set of interviews, would respond to
the Cab problem in a way that was characterized by Well et al. as
deterministic. Specifically, it was predicted that outcome-oriented
subjects would be more likely to:
1) ask whether a number was required in answering the question of
the probability that it was a blue cab;
2) encode the question, "What is the probability..." into the
question, "What color was the oah?» ft-u* „x n c b (this recoding being indicated by
responses to the effect, "I think the cab was blue"); and
3) base a numeric answer on a "loose" or qualitative interpretation
of the evidence they thought relevant.
Performance of subjects with respect to these three predictions is
summarized in Table 5. Interrater reliability for coding these three
categories was estimated by correlating the set of ratings of the two
.
coders, with r = .759. The scoring rule applied was that both coders
had to agree that a particular statement had been made in order for it
to be counted. Scores on the Cab problem were obtained by assigning 1
point for each of the three categories checked, and summing across
categories for each subject. Thus the scores could range from 0 to 3.
These scores were correlated with the outcome scores (as indicated in
Table 5) with r = .612, p<.025 (one-tailed). Considering the moderate
level of interrater reliability, the magnitude of the correlation
coefficient provides strong support for the argument that the
deterministic responses on the Cab problem are related to the features
of the outcome approach. That the predicted responses to the Cab
problem are characteristic of the decision and single-trial features of
the outcome approach is also supported by the content of the interview
excerpts which are provided below.
Given that the goal of the outcome approach is to determine what
will or did occur, the question of probability is translated into the
question, "What happened?" as indicated in the following response:
S1: So you want to know if I think that's right—if it was blue.
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Well, I would say that it would be blue rather thangreen-just the fact that this really isn't important-the
85% are green, 15% are blue. I mean there are still a
substantial amount of blue cabs out there. But the factthat the guy said—well, the court said that in 80% of the
cases you identified the right color. And the guy said he
saw blue He doesn't say, "I think I saw blue." He says
"I saw blue." So I would go with blue.
Given that the Cab problem asks specifically for the probability
that the cab was blue, subjects' query of whether a number is required
is indicative of the decision feature. When subjects asked if a number
was wanted, I hesitated in order to allow them to clarify the question,
and then if they did not continue, I asked them what the alternative was
to giving a number.
511: Let's see. Am I looking for a number as opposed to like—Am
I looking to say "it's 80% probability that it was a blue
rather than green? Is that what I'm
I: What's the other option? How else would you prefer to give
that?
511: "Sure, it could have been a blue cab." No just that it
would have been a strong—it was more likely as opposed to
less likely. Kind of like this fit in. More positive as
opposed to a definite number positive.
Central to the goal of specifying what happened is the single-trial
feature, according to which questions of uncertainty are viewed as
pertaining to a particular event as opposed to a set of events. Subject
5 justified ignoring the base-rate information on the grounds that at
issue was the occurrence of a particular event, and that information
regarding a class of events was irrelevant:
S5: It really doesn't matter how many cabs there are in the
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city. What you're thinking about is this one particular
cab whether it was blue or green. And since the guy was
usually right—he's probably right.
As indicated above, the witness identification can be seen as
applying to the individual event (the color of the errant cab) in a way
the base-rate information cannot. Using the base rates would seem to
require regarding this particular accident as one of a set of acciaents
involving the two cab companies. To the outcome-oriented individual,
this is not relevant to the question. What matters is this particular
accident. (On this basis it could be predicted that outcome-oriented
individuals would be less likely to use base rates than individuals
employing a frequency interpretation. Not enough data are yet available
to test this prediction.) It is evident in the above and following
excerpts that the witness identification is not viewed as one of a class
of similar identifications. Rather, the test situation allows the
outcome-oriented individual to assign the attribute "pretty reliable" to
the witness and thus to the witnesses' identification of the color of
the errant cab. It is in the process of making this attribute that
subjects "let go" of the specific meaning of the 80% and then given a
confidence value for their belief that the cab was blue which is only
loosely based on the 80% estimate of the witness's accuracy.
S8: And since his visibility was pretty clear, and just on
that—I'm not even taking these numbers so much as just, you
know, conceptualizing it. Since he saw it was blue and
there's more of a chance that he's right as seeing it as
blue, that he saw it correctly. So I'll say that.
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I
S3: 80% just because he had-his percentage correct before was
llt\t r^h^S?
S
t
nSe that h6
'
Probabl y~ohance 80% that hegot it ig t this time.
I: OK.
S3: Maybe better.
I: Maybe better?
S3: Yeah. Just— I
—
Can you explain why you think it might be better than that?
S3: Well, because more than not he got them right when they
tested him before. So that's why it would be possible that,he'd be more than 80%. I don't know if that makes sense.
I: About how much more, do you think? Maybe you could just
give it a range
.
S3: Oh, 5 to 10%.
I: So maybe 85 to 90%?
S3: Yeah.
S12: If someone actually saw that it was a blue cab, then I'd
assume it was a blue cab.
I: And what would be the probability that it was blue?
S12: I would say about 70%
I: And how are you getting the 70%, approximately?
S12: Well, allowing for a 10% error in the statistics of 80% of
the cases were correct and 20% were error. So I'm giving
this a little more
—
you know.
I: And why do you feel you want to do that
—
give a little bit
more—room for error?
S12: I'm just a nice person.
S13: Yeah—that he did guess, more than he didn't, the right
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colors. So I'd go with the blue. I'd say that it was ablue one
.
[The coders disagreed as to whether this was an instance of
a qualitative response.]
I: And how about just an estimate of what the probability would
be, or a guess.
S13: I want to say just 80
I: Is that 80 based on this [points to 80% witness accuracy]?
S13: No. I'm just trying to find— I'm just trying to think of
something that's closer to 100—like over to more of a
chance that it happened.
Prediction 2
The second prediction was that outcome-oriented subjects would
prefer the physical features of the bone to frequency data in arriving
at a judgment of which side of the bone was most likely to land upright.
Since this tendency was not anticipated before the first interview was
conducted, there was at that time little probing included to explore
this behavior. Consequently, only a few subjects in the first interview
were judged to have shown such a preference. The Bone-2 problem was
designed to test the extent to which subjects prefer a physical to a
statistical analysis of the bone in making predictions of its tendency
to land on its various sides. Subjects were required to a) choose from
among six alternatives the particular information they would prefer in
anwering the Bone-2 problem, b) to predict the results of ten rolls of
the bone (the information they used to derive their predictions being
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noted), and c) to say how they thought a statistician would determine
the probabilities of each side of the bone landing upright.
Subjects' performance on the Bone-2 problem is summarized in Table
6 (Appendix A). Scores on the problem were obtained by scoring a) 2
points if subjects' first choice was not a frequency and 1 point if the
second choice was not a frequency; b) 2 points if only physical
properties were used in predicting ten trials, 1 point if used in
conjuction with frequencies; c) 2 points if only physical properties
were mentioned in the context of a statistician's method, 1 point if
mentioned along with frequencies. Scores had a potential range of from
0 to 7. The interrater reliability on this problem was 10056. The
correlation between scores on the Bone-2 problem and the outcome scores
provide evidence of a very strong relationship, with r = .788, p<.005
(one-tailed)
.
Two possible reasons for preferring a physical to a statistical
analysis were suggested in Chapter III. One possibility was that the
physical features of the bone might be viewed as a more stable source of
evidence when compared to frequency data which can fluctuate from sample
to sample. This seemed to be the rationale given by Subject 12 for
basing predictions on an inspection of the bone. Asked why she thought
the data from 100 rolls was unimportant, she replied,
S12: Well, because what they did may not be—it's sort of chance,
you know, that happened. If the same 16 people did the same
100 rolls, it would probably be different the second time.
It just doesn't seem a very specific kind of statistic.
I: And why do you think it would be different?
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S12: Things change. I don't think anything duplicates itselfexactly the second time.
I: How about the results I got in 1000 rolls?
S12: Yeah, that too is kind of iffy, if you did the same thing
?nr
r
?non
ir\?1US * Se °0nd rolls~I <nean you could go onfo 2000 rolls or whatever, and I don't know if it really
would tell you much. Then again, I could be wrong.
The second hypothesis as to why a physical analysis might be
preferred is that physical properties are viewed as causal agents of
what one wants to predict while frequency information is not. The first
set of interviews provided no compelling evidence that this is the case;
nor did the second. One subject did feel that the physical properties
were "real evidence" in contrast to frequency data. Asked to explain
how she decided that D was the most likely side she responded,
S3: Well, just 'cause it's flatter on the underside, so it's
more likely to land on that side than it would on any other
place
.
I: Are you using this information at all [the results on her
last ten rolls]?
S3: Maybe a little, yeah. I suppose. Well, I looked first and
thought that was reasonable
. So
Asked how a statistican would determine the probability, she first
mentioned surface area. Asked if they would use anything else, she
said
,
S3: Well, they would probably make rolls themselves and see how
it comes up. But I don't know if they would use that for
real evidence or whatever.
1: You feel like the results of what you got isn't real
evidence?
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S3: Well, yeah It has some. But there must be some you knowlike measuring the side, and that must be a little moreprecise than my rolls.
Ui
Why she regards the properties of the bone as a more valid type of .
evidence is not clear. Her last statement above, however, suggests that
it may be because they are easier for her to think of as being measured
precisely.
The other three subjects who considered features of the bone to be
important in a determination of probabilites felt that they should be
used in conjunction with rather than to the exclusion of frequency data.
Given the six alternatives, Subject 1 3 chose the frequency data, using .
it to arrive at the decision that D was most likely, with 70%
probability
.
S13: I'm just saying 70 because—Well
,
you get 35 for D, 32 for
B, 21 for C [from n=100 data] and, I don't know. Like B
would come in second, right? In my thinking. C would come
in third and then A and E. But 70 sort of gives you over
50/50 chance, and it sort of gives you leeway to—maybe75—sort of gives you leeway that you could still—it won't
come up, and that the 32—either B or C—
When asked to predict the results of ten trials, she quickly wrote
zero for both E and F, then after a pause asked,
S13: I can't look at it [the bone] can I?
I: Would you like to do that too?
S13: Yeah. I forgot which one—where they are.
After she had made her predictions, she was asked how she arrived
at the particular values.
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I don't see why. Both look-maybe I should-No, I'll leaveit like that. d
S13:
She later, in fact, revised her prediction so that C was expected
more frequently than A in accordance with the frequency data. She
appeared to use the two sources together, wanting to make sense of the
frequency data by inspecting the surfaces of the bone.
Subjects 5 and 11 used the two sources of information in a similar
way, analyzing the physical features in an attempt to explain the
frequency data and, in cases, to arbitrate close decisions.
S5: ...I'd take number three [n=1000 data], and I'd look at each
surface of the bone that had come up and compare it to the
number of times it had gotten up and see why it had so I
could decide whether or not the results were accurate,
according to the shape of the bone.
In predicting ten rolls Subject 5 inspected the bone carefully to decide
how he would alot rolls to B and C since, according to him, they were so
close in the frequency of past occurrence. His explanation of how a
statistican would estimate probabilities was consistent with the
approach he had employed:
S5: ...a statistican would count a great deal of weight to the
center of gravity and how it related, and, taking your
results [n=1000 data], would come up with a bunch of
statistics that would probably reflect fairly accurately
your results, with perhaps some modification according to
what he thought the structure of the bone gave out.
Subject 11 used only frequencv data f«y y to make predictions about the
bone, but felt that a statistican would, in a "joint efm .«. J-n fort," supplement
these with an analysis of physical properties:
S11
you can understand why hese-y w Y , '
structurally
,
particular values tn LI f ? OU assi6 n these
both, jusL- f3Ce ' and then throu 8h comparing
I: But I might want to modify what I had got rolling it?
S11: Yeah It's just kind of like added significance or not
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in summary, the tendency to view physical properties of the bone as
important in the determination of probabilites of the various landing
orientations is highly related to measures of the outcome approach.
Physical properties appear to be regarded as information at least on a
par with frequency data in making predictions.
That the first two predictions were verified is not surprising.
Basically what has been established is that subjects will respond
consistently vis-a-vis the outcome approach on problems of the same
type. The last two predictions are meant to serve a different purpose.
They involve using the outcome approach to anticipate specific responses
that had not yet been observed. Because of this, they provide more
compelling evidence of the validity of the outcome approach.
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Prediction 3
In the Painted-die problem subjects were first presented a die and
then six stones, both of which consisted of five elementary outcomes of
one type (black) and one of another (white). They were asked to predict
whether in six trials they would be more likely to observe five blacks
and one white, or six blacks. The answer according to formal
probability theory is that the former is more likely, the probability of
exactly five blacks being .H02, the probability of six blacks being
• 335.
Most people, when asked, will respond that the probability of white
being drawn is one out of six. But it is not clear what is meant by
such an answer other than that there is only one white out of six sides.
If people viewed "one out of six" consistent with formal probability
theory they would expect to get, on the average, one white in six
trials. That is the modal outcome. Even failing this line of
reasoning, one would predict on the basis of the representativeness
hueristic (cf
.
Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) that people would believe five
blacks to be the more likely outcome. Since five black and one white
looks more like, and in this case is identical to, the population
distribution, it should be regarded as more likely than a sample which
does not as closely resemble the population.
It was predicted that outcome-oriented subjects, however, would
regard six blacks as the more likely outcome. In the outcome approach
the primary unit of analysis is the individual trial. Given a
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probability value, one way to arrive at a prediction of a^ u fcQ
decide which yes/no or 1-don-t-know decision point the probability valu,
is closest to. Similarily, rather than viewing the 5/6 as a value that
relates to the expected relative frequency of blacks in randomly drawn
samples, it is given a qualitative interpretation of the approximate
for. "the next trial will result in a black." When one is therefore
asked to predict six trials, rather than using the 5/6 to form an
expectation for the set of six trials, they will arrive at a prediction
by summing over their expectations for each of the six trials. Since
this expectation is more qualitative than quantitative in nature, it is
expected that outcome-oriented subjects will more frequently say that
six blacks are more likely since there are so many of them, and that
they will also believe that the ratio of blacks to white over larger
series of trials will remain above the normative value of five to one.
Interrater reliability for coding the Painted-die problem was 100%.
Table 7 summarizes subjects' responses. Seven subjects felt that six
blacks was more likely in the case of the die, six subjects in the case
of the stones. (Subject 1 3 regarded the two differently and changed her
prediction to five blacks in the stone problem.) Scores for the
Painted^ie problem were obtained by giving 1 point if six blacks were
expected in either the die or stone version; 1 point if fewer than 10
white were expected in 60 trials or if more than six trials, on the
average, were required to roll one white; and 1 point if the probability
of a black on the first trial was estimated to be above 5/6 or 84%. The
scores obtained in this manner were correlated with the outcome scores
from the first set of interviews, with r =
.573, p<.05.
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Excerpts from the interviews suggest that, as predicted, subjects
solved the problem by imagining a single trial for which the probability
of black is overwhelming, and then extending this over trials to arrive
at the conclusion that six blacks was the more likely outcome.
Tull'uLTi^^t"^ White
' S there
'
but-I,m not exactlysure what trying to say. Just because the odds are alwaysthe same. There's only one of them in there. & eventhough it's six rolls and there's six things in there,
time" \Z]LT °i ^ °ther that ' S goinS to up eachme And that-chances are better than-five to one, oneof the five blacks is going to come up.
The responses of Subject 7 were characteristic of a frequency
interpretation in the first set of interviews, and though he knows that
the probability is 5/6 for a black, he still feels that six blacks are
more likely and that ten or less whites would occur in 60 trials.
Similar reasoning is demonstrated by Subjects 12 and 13.
S13: I'd say the black have more chance of coming up. Black
side.
S13: Just, the odds don't seem to be favorable for one white.
S12: I would probably just say you'd get six blacks just because
there are more black sides. The probability of the white
coming up would lessen, I think.
I: Would lessen? What do you mean "would lessen"?
S12: Would diminish.
I: Compared to what?
S12: Compared to the black sides coming up.
The first response of Subject 15 suggests that she is chosing six
black because she doesn't think things are likely to turn out perfect:
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s,5:
JETi^ss fir birk and °ne wwte ^ - *«Mrows is 1 00J— s just perfect. And I think It's morelikely that you'd get the six black sides.
It's clear from the rest of the protocol, however, that she has other
reasons for her belief:
515: Because it's a higher probability of getting a black sidebecause there are more black sides and so there's moreprobability that when you roll it, you're going to get ablack side instead of that one white side.
Subject 3 combined the
-more blacks" rationale with the reasoning
that the sampling with replacement procedure does not guarantee white.
S3: Probably more likely to get all black just cause—I don'tknow what percentage, but most of the die is black, so it'sgoing to come up on that side.
-Cause you're not going to
roll it on a different side each time you roll it, so thatit s bound to come up one of those six rolls. So it
probably would be black on all of them.
Subject 5 believed that rolling six dice at once would result in
five blacks, but that rolling the same die six times would result in six
blacks
.
S5: Well, each roll is a separate entity. You roll it, and a
side will come out. Then you roll it, and a side will come
out. You don't roll all six at one time. So likelihood is
that each time it comes out, the side that has the dominate
color, which is black, is the color that'll come out.
He finally rejected this reasoning, favoring five blacks in both cases.
His intial response, however, provides a good example of what is being
regarded as the outcome approach to this problem—that of imagining the
results of one trial as almost certainly being black, and by extending
this qualitative judgment, concluding that six blacks are more likely
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o-r six trUu
. » 1. especially significant that what ^ ^
subject thi„ ki „g differently abQut u ^ ^^^^ au ^^
occurring at once. ( A similar belief ln ....i a difference between flipping
one coin repeatedly or several .*V at once was defended by the IStta century
mathematician. , A1 embert. For a„ interesting account of this and other
o. DUlemberfs unconventional beliefs about probability, see Todhunter
.
1949.)
Prediction 4
The Modelling problem was designed to test some plications of the
causal feature of the outcome approach. According to the outcome
approach, fluency data are not considered to be as reliable a source
in predicting outcomes as are phenomena that are causally related to the
outcome. aia being the oasei u was predl(;ted outoome_orlenteQ
individuals would hold that if the causal features of a set-up were
altered, outcome frequencies for that set-up would change accordingly.
In the Modelling problem subjects were asked if It would be possible to
construct a model of the bone that would produce resuits which could not
be distinguished from results obtained from rolling the bone. They were
introduced to the modelling concept in the Painted-die problem where it
was suggested that randomly sampling with replacement from six
identically shaped stones would be the same as rolling a fair die. It
was assumed that most subjects would accept this comparison since the
most obvious physical feature-the symmetry of the six sides-was
-intake Wi th an urn »del of the bone> ^
Physical aspects of the bone-its irregularly-shaped sides and unequal
distribution of weight-are transform into unequal numbers of objects
"hich are identical in weight and shape. It was predicted that
outccne-oriented subjects, focusing on this difference, would expect
that the data obtained from conducting trials on the two set-ups would
be distinguishable in some way.
The results of the Modelling problem are summarized in Table 8.
Subjects' performance on the modelling component of the Painted-die
problem is included as well. Scores for the Modelling problem were
generated by assigning 1 point for each of the following four
categories: a) if the urn model was not accepted in the case of the die;
b) if a model of the bone could not be generated by the subject; c) if
the can filled with numbers of stones suggested by the statistical
s
estimates was not accepted as a model of the bone, but the
trial-by-trial method of filling the can was accepted, d) if it was
believed that no model of the bone could be created. Scores on this
problem could thus range from 0 to 4. Interrater reliability for coding
in these four categories was determined by correlating the two sets of
ratings, with r = .93. Tne correlation between these scores and the
outcome scores was r = .610, p<.025.
The reasons given by subjects for rejecting the urn models are
congruent with the hypothesis that they would do so because, in their
analysis, important causal features could not be duplicated in the urn
models
.
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Subjects 3 and 1 3 felt the urn model inappropriate in the
Painted-^ie problem. They did not express concern over the
corresponding features of the die and stone-filled urn per se, but over
the differing sampling procedures in the two cases.
S3: I think maybe the white side of the die would come up morejust
-cause you don't have any control over that [makes an*imaginary roll of the die]-Well, not that you do with thePieces, but-I don't know why. That's just what I think
S3:
....because you're putting your hand in there and takingout. I just
,
I don't know why, but I don't think you'd pickthe white one as often as the white side of the die
S13: I just think grabbing something out—if you're grabbing it
out I think it would be more probable of being white. Idon't know exactly why I'm thinking that way, but with this[die] I just [rolls die]—I don't know, tossing somethingjust seems less of a chance, but picking something out seems
more of a chance. You'd think it would be the other way
around, though. But, I don't know
In the following excerpts, subjects explain why an urn model is
inappropriate in the case of the bone. The fact that the bone has six
sides, uneven surfaces, and is rolled rather than picked out are all
mentioned as important differences.
S3: Probably be more likely to get no Es with the container full
of 100 pieces. Just—well there is a slighter chance that
it would come up, and there's six sides. So that's why I
think it's more likely to come up on the bone.
I: Because?
S3: Because there's only six sides....
S6: Probably it would be more likely to get no Es from the bone,
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The persistance demonstrated by subjects in insisting that the bone
could not be modelled was particularly impressive. The interview probes
were designed to give subjects several opportunities to accept a model:
They were given one alternative after another. The independent coder,
not knowing the intention in this probing, discretely noted in two
instances that the subjects had been strongly led to accept a model.
The other subjects were as strongly "led" but insisted repeatedly that
the model suggested would not be comparable to rolling the bone.
Attending to the physical features as opposed to the resultant frequency
data of a chance set-up appears to be a deeply ingrained orientation.
Speculations about the origin and function of this tendency as well as
of the other two components of the outcome approach will be offered in
the next and final chapter.
CHAPTER VI
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study was undertaken with the goal of inferring an informal
approach to probability that would explain, among other things, why
subject responses to problems involving uncertainty deviate from those
prescribed by formal theories. On the basis of an initial set of
interviews such an informal approach was hypothesized and described as
outcome-oriented. In a second set of interviews, the outcome approach
was used to successfully predict the performance of subjects on a
different set of problems. In this chapter I will elaborate on the
importance of understanding that subjects' performance in situations
involving uncertainty is based on a theoretical framework that is
different in important respects from any formal theory of probability.
Additionally, I will argue that the outcome approach is reasonable given
the nature of the decisions people face in a natural environment. To
this end, I will review research which suggests some reasons why causal
as opposed to statistical explanations of events are salient and
functionally adaptive.
The primary goal of the outcome approach is to successfully predict
outcomes in uncertain situations. When required, outcome-oriented
individuals will provide values which gauge their confidence in the
prediction. In this respect, the outcome approach is similar to a
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personalist theory in that probability is a measure of degree of belief.
However, there are at least two major differences between the two
theories. First, personalist theories were motivated by the desire to
put subjective probabilities on a rational and scientific basis. Thus,
among other requirements in these systems, subjective probabilities of
repeated events should, over a long series of observed trials, closely
approximate the actual frequencies of occurrence.
If a person assesses the probability of a proposition being
true as
.7 and later finds that the proposition is false, thatm itself does not invalidate the assessment. However, if ajudge assigns
.7 to 10,000 independent propositions, only 25
of which subsequently are found to be true, there is something
wrong with the assessment The attribute that they lack is
called calibration Formally, a judge is well calibrated
if, over the long run, for all propositions assigned a given
probability, the proportion of true equals the probability
assigned. ( Lichtenstein
,
Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1981, p. 2)
The outcome-oriented individual appears uninterested in calibration
as defined above, but rather is interested in whether or not, on a
particular occasion, a correct prediction can be made. If a prediction
turns out to be in incorrect, the prediction was wrong and the
confidence value, if assigned, was erroneous.
The other, and related, difference between the outcome and
personalist approach is the method by which frequency data are
translated into a confidence value. Since a goal in a personalist
theory is to be well calibrated, frequency of past occurrence of some
event is interpreted directly as a confidence in the future occurrence
of the event, all other things being constant. (Applying Bayes 1 Theorem
to subjective probabilities is one algorithm that guarantees good
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calibration.) In the outcome approach, frequency data are not directly
used to formulate a probability. It is especially clear in the Cab,
Painted-die, and Bone problems that frequency information is first
translated into a more qualitative belief from which a numeric
confidence is subsequently generated if necessary. A similar two-stage
process of generating subjective probabilites has been suggested by
Adams and Adams (1961) and more recently by Koriat, Lichtenstein and
Fischhoff (1980)
.
To assess one's confidence in the truth of a statement, onefirst arrives at a confidence judgment based on internal cues
or "feelings of doubt".... Tne judgment is then transformedinto a quantitative expression, such as a probability that the
statement is correct. (Koriat et al
. , p. 108)
It should be added that the latter step of transforming internal cues
into probability values is probably not an essential component of the
outcome approach outside the laboratory. It seems to be done, and often
begrudgingly, only if a request for a percentage or probability is made.
In the outcome approach, discriminating between small differences
in the strength of these inner feelings is not what is most important.
If the goal is to predict the most likely outcome on a particular
occasion, one only need be aware of which outcome is associated with the
strongest inner feeling. In this respect, it has been argued that
people are well-prepared for the majority of decisions they face from
day to day (Fhaner, 1977). When a decision must be made, seldom are
frequency data available. Not only are they unavailable, but in many of
the situations we face, frequency data would be of limited and
questionable value. It is difficult to imagine, for example, what
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iage. or of whether or not to start^ . bomb shaltar
. For
-t decisions, however, fregency data could be of considerable
help--Whloh oar to buy
, whioh ooUege ^ auendt wMch^ ^^
which judge to hope for and whioh jury to select.
The benefits of simplifying 3Uch problem by employing judgment
heuristics seem obvious, considering the physical or mental space whioh
would be required so that reievent data could be held readily available.
According to this
..heuristic hypothesis... it is possible that at some
more basic level, people reason in accord with formal probability
theory, but to save time, heuristics are usually, and consciously,
employed. In fact, people could be viewed as acting consistently with
formal probability theory if they are believed to be using judgment
heuristics because "they often work with a rate of success that is more
than fortuitous" (Kahneman 4 Tversky, 1972, p. i,52) .
That people do not have conscious control over these "heuristic"
judgments is suggested In the Bone and the Painted-die problems. When
given data that required no summarizing, subjects still appeared to
translate the data into more qualitative judgments from which
probability estimates were derived. In the case of the Painted-die
problem, thia processing led to a prediction that was inconsistent with
what one would expect on the basis of the representativeness heuristic.
In the outcome approach, the transformation of frequency data into
beliefs is not accomplished via heuristics, but through causal analysis
and theory construction. That is, the outcome-oriented individual
eras
c
'ontructs theories about the phenomena
consideration ^
~ - only as . basis of predlctlQn perhaps
_ ^
as a basis of explanation.
The tendency to search for caus.ii al as opposed to statistical
explanations was apparent in subjects' renon, -p ses to raost of the probl.,
US6d ln thiS Stud
^ importance of causalitv in ny m making probabilistijudgments has been demonstrate innstrated m a variety of other contexts. Azjen
(1977) and Tversky and Kahneman ( 1980) have SUggested ^ base _rate
-formation is more likely to be incorporated into probability
estimates if presented in a way that strongly implies a causal link
"tween^^ * «" <«* and the event of interest. Similar
to performance on the Misfortune problera, subjects given biographies of
deviants tend to reconstrnot- th. • ^nstruct the information so that the plight of the
"victim" can be viewed a<? an i„ Q n. L ,s an inevitable result of life-events (Rosenhan,
1973). Also, subjects given descriptions of accidents search for a
Pattern in the associated events that maKe the accident appear
predictable and avoidable (Walster, 1962).
Several hypotheses can be advanced as to why people are prone to
causal explanations even in the case of chance events (see Bulman
,
1977). toe 01.U, based on a Kantian epistomology, u that the uay we
construct reality presupposes causality and that the perception of
causality, therefore, is adaptive in an evolutionary sense:
...attribution processes are to be understood, not only as ameans of providing the individual with a veridical view If hi.world but as a means of encouraging and main tuning his
lS
effective exercise of control in that world. We purpose ofcausal analysis-the function it serves for the species andthe individual-is effective control. (Kelley. w° P 22)
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Another hypothesis is that u as^ ^ § ^ ^
founded on the ability to exercise control over the environs, a
causal view is
r«uU3
eCted Th °Ur ™anlPula"ve techniques for produci„K
-Tel^iy connect: r^e't^ °f ^preventing it. (Gasking,
, 955 p ^83) '
"& " *
A causal orientation is advantageous not oniy if lt leads t0 .
degree of control over ones environs, hut also if it gives even the
illusion of control, as suggested in the response of Subject 17 to the
Misfortune problem:
Sl7:
coisi'ste^cftf!"
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OPle ablG to P-dict-lend some
And I think th^ V" future~they feel more safe....
sol S of r
e°Ple
K
COUld l0°k int0 the future ^d have
even make thi r T^ " a"d it,S a future th^t wouldhem feel more at ease.
This subject acknowledged that his own chance explanation for the
Misfortune problem would provide no such sense of security, but felt
nevertheless resigned to his belief that co-occurrences of that type are
more likely than not to be fortuitous.
Chance explanations are based on a model not only in which the
notion of control is abandoned, but where predictability is often
limited to aggregate as opposed to individual events.
The separate throws of this series seem to occur in utterdisorder; it is this disorder which causes our uncertainty
about them. Sometimes head comes, sometimes tail comes
sometimes there is a repetition of the same face, sometimes
not. So long as we confine our observations to a few throws
at a time, the series seems to be simply chaotic. But when we
consider the result of a long succession .. .a kind of order
begins gradually to emerge (Venn, 1962, p. 5)
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That subjects seem unable to understand, op du least to accept.
non-causal models, can be viewed 33 3 deep c°"itn,e„t on their part to
eneBta eSP°USed
* * — or prediction and
—
A similar MBlit„t has been demonstrated by physicists in a
rerusai to accept tbe probabiiistic Nation and implications or
quantum mechanics Cp n d u(e.g.. Bohm.
,957). Nor can the hypothesis that
causal theories provide better predictability i„ most re.l-Uf,
situations be rejected. It is still an open questio„ whether subjects,
use of rrecuency data to rormulate causal explanations typically results
in better predictability than the direct assessment or readily available
accurately usi„g causal as opposed to statistical inrormation, they
appear to operate on the assumption that they can. TMs assumption is
the heartbeat or the outcome approach.
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TABLE 1
SUBJECT BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Major College Math & Statistics
(Interview 1) (Interview 2)
1 M Psych H S STAT Intro STAT*
2 M Psych H S STAT Intro b TAT*
3 F Psych M '— *— CI U± l_l O
4 M Forestry calculus
Intro STAT
5 M Comm.
Disorders
6 F Psych precalculus* Intro STAT*
7 M Psych precalculus*
8 F Psych precalculus
Intro STAT
Q
r Psych
10 F Psych precalculus
11 M Psych precalculus
12 F Elem. Ed.
13 F Pub.
Relations
14 F Psych Intro STAT*
15 F Psych precalculus
Business STAT
16 F Psych Intro STAT
*Currently enrolled
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Subject No.
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Error due to
variability
of weather
More trials of
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Subject: Sll
Interviewer: C. Konold
Date: Dec. 1981
Weather problem
001 I: First, what does it mean when a weather forecaster savstomorrow there's a 70% chance of rain"?
7
002 S: It might rain.
003 I: Uh-huh.
004 S Other than that-It's weird because I don't really pay atten-tion to weather forecasts, so 7
005 I: Uh-huh.
006 S: It's a different situation, I'll tell ya. Given how I pay
attention to weather forecasts, to me it means pretty much
nothing.
007 I: Uh-huh.
008 S: You know, I mean, I guess to some people you know it's impor-
tant to them. I mean er, it's weird 'cause—yesterday-
yesterday someone was talking about a er
, they were upset—
or not yesterday the day before—they were upset by the—
about the snowstorm that we had because the weatherman
hadn t predicted it.
009 I: Uh-huh.
010 S: And so I guess some people guide you know, or guide, to
to some extent, their behavior on it but, I don't know. It
really doesn't mean too much to me, I don't know.
011 I: What does the number— in this case, the 70%—tell you?
012 S: Oh, well, it's a high probability or likelihood that it will
rain.
013 I: Uh-huh. If you'd—Go ahead.
014 S: I'm not sure—like in what context do you mean
—
you know,
"What does it mean"?
120
015 I. I m just wondering in this particular context, if you heardsomeone say there's 70% chance of rain tomorrow, what thatnumber 70% would tell you. For example, suppose you hearSinstead, it was 50% chance of rain tomorrow
016 S: MmMm. 0k, I see what you're saying. So, well I guess the
70% would mean that it's, you know, it's higher likelihoodthat it would rain, as opposed to the 50. I don't know
I just uh, with the weather forecasting it's not-your know,It s not— It's like it can change.
017 I: Uh-huh.
018 S: so quickly that the number itself doesn't seem as though it'sthat much of a clue to whether or not it's going to rain.
019 I: Any idea of where they come up with that number, you know,
the 70%?
020 S: Where the weather people would do it?
021 I: MmMm.
022 S: Urn, well let's see. I have a friend who is a meteorologist
and so she should probably, you know, in my talking with her—just from conditions, I guess, you know, from atmosphere and
from var—things—variables, I guess. Yeah. Uh, the—
I
guess the weather is just like a lot of problems where you're
looking at a whole bunch of variables and as they, as they
come to gether in one situation, you know, how they're—and
today, you know, if you look out and you see clouds here and
they're so high up, and there's moisture here or whatever.
Then it kind of adds up to a likelihood that it will do some-
thing and maybe the 70% is—maybe when they say that it has to
do with how sure they are that it's going to happen, I don' t know.
023 I: Suppose a forecaster says that there is a 70% chance of rain
tommorrow and you went out the next day and in fact it didn't
rain. What would you conclude about that statement that
had been made, that there was a 70% chance of rain?
024 S: Well, this
—
probably what would be most important uh, if it
didn't rain, umm, would be in how I would assess, you know,
the next statement. You know, if they said that the next day
it was going to rain.
025 I: Uh.huh.
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know the L T 1^ be C«**«« With »e >idea that he or she or whatever-it was predictedthat it was going to rain the next day with a 70% chance
^ake into"^ " ^^ Wr°n8 ' And n0W ' know, I'llt mt consideration on the next occasion
02 7 I: Uh-huh.
028 S: uh, that they were wrong on one occasion. And that wasn'tvery well said. But you kind of get the idea; yeah. It
would just kind of help me, you know, decide on whether or
not I think it s going to rain the next time they say it'sgoing to rain. y
029 I: Suppose you wanted to determine how accurate a particularforecaster was
030 S: MmMm.
031 I: in making certain predictions. And on 10 days, you kept
track on 10 days when they predicted 70%
032 S: right.
033 I: Urn, chance that there would be rain. And on those 10 days
that they predicted that there was 70% chance of rain, urn,
on 3 of them, in fact, it didn't rain. What would you con-
clude about the accuracy of this particular forecaster?
034 S: Oh, it seems as though they were pretty much right on.
Because, you know, in the whole of the 10 days they were
right, uh, on three of the occasions, which would be 30%,
they— it didn't rain and that's what they kind of predicted,
almost, maybe.
035 I: Uh-huh. What are you thinking?
036 S: Well, cause it's like—they didn't predict a 10 day span:
They predicted each individual day.
037 I: Uh-huh.
038 S: And so it seems as though when each day comes up it's a
whole in itself, it's not necessarily put together in a
unit
.
039 I: Uh-huh.
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040 S: So that-I guess it's almost like when you roll-It's like
h r::; %z r ro11 th: dice - you "°uid ^ ;„f„r
041 I: Uh-huh.
^ S: itVthf^ let ' S Yeah - So each time you do it
as you add all the different"^
0
^^ \ ^it almost seems that it's not the same. together,
043 I: it's not the same?
044 S
045 I
^h2Vi«\UOt ^ Same - lt
'
S alm° St Uke ^u can,t addthem together. But maybe you can, I don't know. This ishard, I don't really understand.
Maybe you can just explore why that seems inappropriate toadd them together.
046 S: Mmm.
047 I: You mean—what you're saying somewhat is to look at their
accuracy over 10 days is not quite appropriate? I ,because they're predicting for each individual day?
mean
,
048 S: Right. And yeah, so it kind of gets back to the idea that
they were pretty much right getting 7 out of 10 right.
049 I: Uh-huh.
050 S: Umm, maybe it's not fair to, to judge it that way. Maybe
you should just judge it on each one. But I guess—well
maybe you can add them together beacuse they're all the
same. They're all like 70% and urn, no, it really can't
rain 70% of the—well, can it rain 70% of the day? Is
that what they mean? Or is— I don't know. Er, it would
depend on whether or not it rained. It would first depend,
I guess, how you would quantify if it rains.
051 I: Uh-huh.
052 S: And then if it rains on the day, or if you just have to have
a few drops as opposed to it raining for a period of time-
maybe that would affect it.
053 I: Uh-huh.
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054 S: This is a logic swirl,
055 I
056 S:
057 I:
059 I;
060 S
or Z:'ll assess'the'ac™?
1
" *~ *" *—* «-
058 S: MmMm.
What's your er, you're a little confused about that. What
•
your sense about how accurate this forecaster is?
Well, I probably would say that he was pretty close because
061 I: MmMm.
062 S: he was just-because he thought, or she thought urn, it wasgoing to rain on-it had a 70% possibility for each of thedays and he was right 7 out of 10 times, or she was right,
and that's, I don't know, it just—
063 I: Would they have been more accurate had it rained on all 10
of the days? Would that be more impressive to you?
064 S: Well that's weird * cause- 'cause it almost seems that it's-
it almost seems, I don't know.
065 I: What are you thinking?
066 S: Well, I'm thinking that if they go over, it's almost like
they re going over, and they're wrong the other way.
067 I: Uh-huh.
068 S: It's raining more than they really predicted.
069 I: Uh-huh.
070 S: But it's not like they predicted that it would rain 70% on
70% of the days of these next 10 days. It's like they pre-
dicted rain for each day.
071 I: Uh-huh.
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072 S;
073 I
074 S
075 I
076 S
077 I
078 S
079 I:
080 S
:
081 I:
And if
--and they were 70% sure, then they-then if they
on T if th/\*ere 70% sure that U was §oi^ to «*»each day and then as the higher-yeah. If they had more-it it rained on more of those days it would seem as thoughthey, urn, that they were more accurate,
MmMm.
But then if it's only supposed to rain on 70% of those days
then as you increase the number above 70-7, then they would beless accurate.
So you're sort of in a dilemma there?
Yeah, I don't know, it depends.
Umm, numbers are often assigned to various events like e-
lections, sporting events, causes of death. For example
you might hear something like er
, someone will make a state-
ment like "the equal rights ammendment has a 25% chance of
being ratified by the June '82 deadline."
MmMm
.
Urn, if you heard a statement like that, what would that 25%
in that particular context mean to you?
It doesn't sound good.
Uh-huh.
082 S: You know. I guess it kind of clues you in on whether or not
it's going to pass or if it is going to be ratified. Urn,
and, but shoot. I don't know what I should do with it past
that
.
083 I: Any idea where that number would 've come from? When you hear
that 25%, what does—25% of what?
084 S: Yeah. I don't know. It would be really, I think that would
be—If it was like in a context of every day, I would pro-
bably just, like, I would think of it as meaningless.
085 I MmMm
086 S: Umm, yeah, I don't know, because, uh, probably one of the
reasons is, is 'cause I had a um, an intro methods course
125
087
for sociology. And some of the statements that we were for-not forced to make but that we had to make, were lust veryer you know-using numbers and trying to be persuasivlwith numbers. They weren't-it wasn't^ useful" Jou know.
: Can you give an example?
088 S: Umm, it's, well, I'm thinking of elections because I took itduring the election, while the 1980 election was going on-the presidential election-and we did something wfth the-Hke, I don t know, Carter had such and such a percentage ofgetting a certain number of votes •
089 I: MmMm.
090 S. And, Uhh I don't know how we got it. I can't remember how
we got the percentage. But it was kind— I don't know, it
wasn t—it didn't really have any meaning to me because—Some people will look at that, like they'll-l guess one
ot the complaints about having the live coverage of the big
campaigns is that some people will be persuaded at the
last moment—moment, given who's running and how much per-
centage they're getting of the uh, of the incoming ballots,
and then it will influence their voting behavior. And so
I guess what I kind of meant, uh, that it wasn't useful is
that, uh, it didn't clue you in on anything about the situa-
tion. It didn't give you any information about whether or
not, for example, the E.R.A.— it doesn't tell you whether or
not it should be ratified. It's just, you know, it's just
kind of like a number that's thrown at you that it might be.
091 I: Uh-huh. ^ There's another, er, you hear a statement too, like
a person's chance of dying before the age of 40 are 25%.
What does that 25% in that case tell you ?
092 S: Mmm, mortality rate; how many prople are dying,
093 I: MmMm.
094 S: maybe, before that.
095 I: Is that easier for you to understand?
096 S: Yeah. Kind of. Yeah, it seems like it's easier to pigeon
hole it—It's easier to, er, give— to figure out—or to look
back on what kinds of things that they would be looking at,
you know.
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Bone problem
I. Urn, I have a bone here that has 6 surfaces and I've writtenthe letters A through F
,
urn, one on each surface S you
r^ht'
0 that
'
WMCh Slde d
° y°U think would ^nd up-ight? You can sort of inspect it but don't roll it, yet.
002 S: Don't roll it? OK. Should I try to figure out-verbally?
003 I: Sure: Yeah, I'd like that.
004 S A
V~l
hat
,
Vm trying t0 d
° is
'
um
'
is J ust > figure outwhich side would land and stay on the bottom.
005 I: MmMm.
006 S: And so— it would almost seem as though the flatter end wouldtry to stay on the bottom, I would think, you know, if you
were to roll it.
007 I: MmMm.
008 S: I'm almost trying to picture it rolling. Um, well, and I
guess I'm assuming that—that it will, er, that there is,
uh, there is a preferred orientation like if you do roll it
,
009 I: MmMm.
010 S: you know, rather than with a dice that's fixed. Um, which
is, I guess, symmetrical, and if you roll it it'll—can pop
up anywhere. I guess I think I would go with the flatter
end or side would be on the bottom, and, yeah.
011 I: MmMm. So which side do you think would land upright?
012 S: Yeah, so I think probably C would land up. Right.
013 I: MmMm. OK. And how likely is it, do you think that C would
land upright?
014 S: Well, trying to assess that, I would probably go the next
step and figure out, try to figure out which would be the
next, if any—which I would—which side I would think would
come up next and then kind of
—
015 I: MmMm.
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016 S; And if I wanted to try and be accural t*a
out the 3rd ohp
urate, I d try to fi,ne,
curate ' gure
017 I: MmMm.
018 S:
019 I:
020 S:
021 i: MmMm.
022 S: Umm, Oh, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5-6 sides.
023 I: There are 6 only.
024 S: 6 sides. So it's got 1 in 6 chance of coming up.
025 I: What, er
, what did you say? One in—
026 S: 1 in 6 chance of coming up, if it was just,
027 I: MmMm.
028 S: you know if it would come up. If each side has an equalcnance of coming up, then it— 1 in 6.
029 I: MmMm.
030 S: But, ufa, since I think it's a preferred side, make it
± in 3, umm, and, of course this side— 1 in 3 So that
would be like 33 or 30%, or something like that.
031 I: Why don't you go ahead and roll it and see what happens.
032 S: [Rolls C] Oh, wow!
033 I: Wow what? Hold it before you roll it anymore.
034 S: How come that came up just like that?
035 I: What do you mean?—That's
—
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036 S: I can't believe it.
037 t- You're surprised that it came up the way you predicted?
038 S: Yeah. That's weird.
039 I: How come?
040 S: Well, because, uh, I only predicted 1 in 3 and
041 i: Uh-huh.
042 S. baby came up first time. It's not supposed to do that.
gotta vou
8
k
t0 b\Uke ' ^ y°U r°n the first and it's, y now, make it on the last one.
043 I: Uh-huh.
044 S: And then it mak^c Tt-'n „ £" Kes It—It s a more fun game that way.
045 I: So that was weird?
046 S: Yeah, it was. Yeah, that's pretty strange.
047 I: What do you conclude about your prediction?
048 S: I guess it was right.
049 I: Uh-huh.
050 S: So I guess I looked at the right things or whatever.
051 I: So what do you conclude now, having rolled it once?
052 S: That, uh, maybe it will come up more than, you know— so
maybe it will come up more than 1 in 3
.
053 I: Would rolling it more help you conclude which side—
05 4 S: It would seem as though it would. Yeah. It seems a little
higher, yeah, given the higher n, you know.
055 I: Why don't you roll it as many times as you like and sort of
let me know what you're thinking or concluding as you go
along.
056 S: [Rolls A] Allright. That's a whole opposite side.
057 I: That's A.
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058 S
059 I:
060 S:
061 I j
062 S:
063 I:
064 S:
065 I:
067 S:
068 I:
069 S:
070 I
071 S
072 I
073 S
074 I:
075 S:
076 I:
Well that's good. That
' s better . [Rolls B] Alrightso maybe it isn't. u 6nc '
Why are you saying 'alright*?
Well, 'cause it seems as though if there are-if a bunch of
uTanTfLTth
8 UPT°^ 3 rea1-^ couL "u to t d ind these bones, if you don't want to buy die.
Uh-huh.
You can have a fun game of playing bones instead of die.
So you're thinking it's—
Maybe it's, uh, maybe, urn, it'll come up any way.
MmMm.
You know so maybe it doesn't have a preferred orientation.That s what I guess I was thinking. I'll try it again.
I Rolls B] . e
B.
Yep. So what I would probably do as I was continuing to
roll it, you know, if I wanted to figure out if it was,
er, if it did have like a preferred orientation
MmMm.
is I'd probably just add them up, you know, in 6 columns
MmMm.
and ^ see which ones came up the most. And I guess E and F
don't seem to be coming up. Maybe because it's too heavy.
That would be pretty—Hmm.
So how many times would you, er , if you kept track, how many
times would you want to roll it before you concluded which
side?
Before it was a pretty certain
MmMm.
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078 I:
079 S:
077 S. estxmate Umm, I don't know. Maybe, give it a-you have
l^Veli*™^ " ^ ^eTcoupl
15 or-it ; L° ^
W°Uld
^ 2 ' like 12 or
in sho t w ' ""'J 8U6SS YOU Pr°bably Could d° "a rt, short enough time-I mean number of rolls.
M*Mm
k?
You want to roll it a few more times and see what you
So°ti^
Dl
R 1° ° u
0^ 5 T [R° 11S C] C COmes UP- [*>lla B]hat--B has three. [Rolls B] Four. [Inspects bone] Somaybe flt's that bump that throws it off. [Rolls C, D] A
[Rolls C, C] Hmm, I don't know. It's-It's like, well itseems that what I'm getting is that it does prefer, urn, this-
-you know, these, uh, and C er, the letters in this orienta-tion.
080 I: MmMm.
081 S: But it doesn't
— it seems to prefer uh, B, C and D.
082 I: MmMm.
083 S: [Rolls D] But it hasn't landed that much on A.
08A I: Do you have any idea of which of those 3, which is most
likely?
085 S: Well, I'll go for that one, [as rolling—Cj. Oh, C. So C isgoing to be it. But I think it's B.
086 I: You think it's B?
087 S: Yeah, I think it's B. Yeah, but it's real close. So that
if I was to give a, you know, like a— to give a percentage,
it would probably be like uh, let's see, 40, 30.
088 I: 40 for B?
089 S: Yeah, 30 and 30.
090 I: 30 for C and 30 for D?
091 S: Yeah. Something like that. But except that then well, you'd
have to take into account that these would come up once in
a while, E and F and A would come up once in a while. So I
guess it would be like
—
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092 I: Have you got any A's, do you remember?
093 S
\ or
n
2
tW0;. I/0n '? remember but ic doesn't-maybe we got1 2 but it doesn't seem-well, probably not 2. Thenwe d probably would've remembered it.
094 I: MmMm,
095 S
096 I:
It seems as though we got mostly B ' s and then C and D wereabout the same. Do you know what kind of bone this is?
Uh, it's from a deer; it's an ankle bone from a deer. Urnhow many times would you want to roll before you were ab-
solutely sure of what numbers to give to the sides?
097 S: Umm, absolutely sure? Uh, that's a weird one, 'cause, youknow, it s like you, how do you, you know , where do you
start making—what do you use to figure it out?
098 I: MmMm. Well just an estimate of how many times you'd roll
and keep track of before you felt pretty confident about it.
099 S: Uh-huh. Probably, I don't know, something like— it would be
boring, but something like 100.
100 I: MmMm.
101 S: You know, it would take a pretty high, you know—because it
would be the first time that I've ever seen it, so, I mean—
102 I: I got real bored one day and rolled it a thousand times.
103 S: Wow!
104 I: And this is what I recorded.
105 S: So D is the preferred, huh? Wow! E came up? That's pretty
weird [inspects bone].
106 I: So what—what are you thinking?
107 S: Oh, umm, well I would have thought that A would've come up
more than E.
108 I: Uh-huh-
109 S: But it is kind of like— 2 is pretty insignificant given a
thousand
.
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110 I
111 S:
112 I:
113 S:
114 I:
115 S:
116 I:
117 S:
118 I:
119 S
120 I
121 S
122 I:
123 S:
124 I:
125 S:
126 I:
127 S:
128 I:
Uh-huh
.
But—And these two are pretty close.
B and C?
Yeah.
Would you be willing to conclude that B is more likely than
Yeah but n-not it 1 s-because the numbers are so close it'snot—rt's not that bip a difference.
Would you be willing to conclude that D is more likely than
Yeah, that would—Yeah. That would be pretty— there ' s
enough of a difference that it's definitely—sure
.
If I ask you what's the chance of rolling a D, what wouldyou say?
Oh, I'd almost say 1 in 4 because it's pretty close to 400.
MmMm
.
And, so. Well, would it be 1 in 4? No, it would be 4 out
of 10, whatever that would be. So a 40% chance.
OK. I'm going to ask you to roll it 10 times— the bone 10
more times, but before you do it, to predict how many of
each letter you will get. Umm, and maybe you could write
it up there and we could keep track.
OK. I think— it's alright if I just use this information
here?
You can use whatever information you want to.
OK. This seems like it's more valid because it's got such
a high n.
MmMm.
So what should I do, write on here?
Just write the letter and beside it, how many you predict
you'll get out of 10 rolls.
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129 S:
2
K
;nd
u
n' \ th±:k Vm probably just 8oin^ to s° with b,
hiding! th3t t0 ° MS °r- lRefe"ln« to of
130 I: No, that's fine.
131 S;
Jittl^-jet'^ ° f 10 ' hUh? That
'
S 8°in8 t0 take >
s see
.
132 I: What are you trying to do?
133 S Uh well just to round up and round out-You know, roundotf these percentages—what would be percentages if youdivided. Umm, well, let's see 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. I think-
cause I have-at first I'm starting out with the uh, the100 s unit
.
134 I: Uh-huh.
135 S: And I'm just gonna assign 3 , 2 and 2 , and then divide thelast two or last three. And this would have to get 1.
136 I: The D would have to get 1 more?
137 S: One more. So it'd have to have at least 4.
138 I: MmMm.
139 S: And I would probably assign, I guess—let's see, maybe a
second one and then one to here, yeah. So that would be
a 5 , 2 , and 3
.
140 I: MmMm.
141 S: Yeah. I guess that's good.
142 I: And why have you given none to either A or E?
143 S: Uh, 'cause they just— they have— if they—E and F didn't
come up when I rolled it.
144 I: Uh-huh.
145 S: And it's really small—and A is smaller than E. And I don't
remember if A came up but
—
146 I: So it's somewhat based on what you remember rolling too?
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147 S: Yeah, somewhat. Right
148 I OK. Well why don't you go ahead and roll that and keeptrack of what we get.
149 S: [Rolls D] So we have a D. Should I write it here?
150 I: Yeah. If you could just keep track or I'll forget.
151 S: OK So we have one. [Rolls D] Oh, wow. Another D.[Rolls B] OK. We got a B. That's pretty good.
152 I: Why'd you say that's pretty good?
153 S: It's kind of staying in line, almost. [Rolls E] Oh, noHow did we get it? Oh, no! That totally throws it off.
So we got to put it on this side.
154 I: Just write E and keep track there.
155 S: E—he got one. [Rolls B] Oh boy. Come on D.
156 I: Come on D, Huh?
157 S: Yeah, well, we want a— [Rolls D] oh go—yeah. How come
the C is not coming up though? So we got 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
158 I: 6 so far.
159 S: [Rolls D, D]
.
160 I: That's 8 rolls. What do you predict you'll get on the
next 2, here?
161 S: Predict? Probably D's. D's and a B, probably, well, Yeah,
Eight— 'cause, well—See, I have like a—you can look at
it as 10 rolls or you can look at it as 1 roll and then
1 more roll. And
—
163 I: What do you mean you can look at it as 10 or 1 roll and
1 more roll?
164 S: It's, well, I shouldn't really let this influence how it's
going to roll again.
165 Is Uh-huh
166 S: 'Cause it's probably going to come up more D's— It has a
higher chance of coming up D.
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167 I
168 S
169 I:
170 S:
171 I:
172 S:
173 I:
174 S:
175 I;
176 S:
177 I:
178 S:
179 I:
180 S:
181 I:
182 S:
183 I:
184 S:
Uh-huh
.
than anything else. But, I don't know, it's weird It
seems as though over the long run it should come up acertain— it should fall in line with that.
Uh-huh.
And maybe if you do have a high enough number of rolls.
But it—each time you roll it, D is more likely to come
up than anything else.
So is that why you're predicting a D and a B in the next
two rolls?
Yeah. A D or B. But then, there's another part of me that
wants to say that C will come up because it hasn't come up,
MmMm.
you know, which maybe is kind of false.
MmMm.
But— 'cause there's no—it's not like— it's not like—
this information isnt
, kind of, willing over this problem
[pointing to results of eight rolls].
MmMm.
It's gonna roll—that bone is going to do whatever it will
do each time.
Mmm.
And so past isn't going to influence how it's going to
roll in this one— I think that makes sense.
OK. Why don't we roll it and see what happens, here.
[Rolls C] What is it with this? An intelligent being here?
That's what it is. I don't believe it.
So what do you think now?
I think it's a prop
—
(laughing) I'm just kidding. Well
I still think that—what I said a minute ago, was true.
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185 I:
186 S:
187 I:
188 S:
189 I:
190 S:
191 I:
192 S:
193 I:
194 S:
195 I:
196 S:
197 I:
001 I:
002 S:
003 I:
MmMm.
And C just came up because of the way it was rolled
IRolls D] And that would kind of like further-that wouldback what I— it would seem to.
So how do you feel about your prediction?
Pretty awful. Well, actually, it wasn't too bad because
uh, the E is only off by 1—er, the E— the D is off by 1
This [points to C] is only off by 1. Wait a minute. 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Go man, yeah. These [points
toB and C] are only off by 1. This is off by 1, and this[points to E]
.
MmMm
That's pretty good. Sure.
If you were going to roll it 10 more times, and you were
going to predict what you'd get, would you change what you—
I'd probably still go with this.
Uh-huh.
This is a freak. This is just—That will never happen again.
You won't ever get an E again?
Maybe, I don't know.
OK.
Misfortune problem
I know of a person to whom all of the following things
happened on the same day: First, his son totalled the
family car and was seriously injured; next he was late to
work and nearly got fired; then he got food poisoning at
a restaurant in the afternoon; and in the evening he found
out that his father had died. How do you account for all
those things happening on the same day?
Bad Karma.
Bad what?
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004 S: Karma. You know, he just like-it wasn't-
005 I: Oh, bad Karma.
006 S: You know, it just wasn' t happening for him that day.
007 I: Uh-huh.
008 S: But well each one of those is a separate event and whythey would happen on the same day, I don't know. There'sno— I m trying to look for clues, you know, trying tofigure out why.
009
010
Is that a question that you'd ask yourself if you just heardtnat or that happened to a friend of yours?
Well, how I would react is just uh, if it was a friend of
mine you know, probably the first— I wouldn't
— I'd try tobe— I'd try to just help him—
011 I: Uh-huh.
012 S: deal with it. Uh, but, and I don't know if I would— It
would be kind of unusual. And so you would probably wonder
why me, you know, or "why him"
—
013 I: MmMm.
014 S: or "why on the same day" uh, and maybe what I would do is
take each one and—like for example with the— I guess the
father died or something?
015 I: Right. First his son got in an accident and totalled the
car. And next he was late to work and nearly got fired. And
then he got food poisoning. And then he heard that his
father died.
016 S: Yeah. I would probably just look at each one individually.
And so if the son was like— I don't know—try to make each
one fit. If his son was just a bad driver or whatever. Or
if he was a good and just— it was, you know—or he'd never
gotten into an accident or something. Try to figure out
something about—maybe, maybe just he'd had it good for too
long and there was just like uh, all these bad things piling
up, just waiting to come at him, or something.
017 I: MmMm.
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an idea about » J s y ^"^"k8'™ ""^ y°U know '
all at the sa,e tame.' * ^ Uni ° f haPPe"e <i
019 I: Uh-huh.
020 S: But other than that, I don't know.
021 tl Have you ever had anything very unlikely happen to you?
022 S: Very unlikely?
023 I: Yeah.
024 S: Umm.
025 I: other than rolling that C a minute ago.
S:
sure"
6
Oh'":^ 1 d°n,t k— ^t me see. Oh,. , gee, yeah.
027 I: How did you make sense of that?
028 S: Um, well, it was a bad car.
029 I: Uh-huh.
030 S: It's just a lousy car. And uh, it was something like wewere uh, I m trying to remember the event. Oh yeah OK
fnrnM ^ ^ ^ ^ 5 ° V 6 ^arS ^° > ^ ™* hada problem with it's starter or something. And it wouldn't-
sometimes you'd turn the key and nothing would happen. Andyou d figured the battery was dead. And it wasn't thebattery, and you'd figure something else; and it wasn'tthat. And it happened once or twice and then uh, and I'd
curse at it. And a couple of minutes later it would start
up. And I couldn't understand it. And then one night, we,
er, it was during the summer and we had gone out to uh—
a
bunch of my friends and I, and we'd gone out to some amuse-
ment park.
031 I: Mmm..
032 S: And we were coming back and
ing. And, you know we were
car that was, er, you know,
went to a store and the car
bad thing to have happen to
it was like 1 or 2 in the morn-
in no condition to deal with a
that would die on us. And we
died on us. It was a really
us. We were like—we were up
139
W T UVed ' YOU kn°W ' °n the CaP e it's along walk home and-But
,
I think-and something else happened that night too, that was weird. 'Cause at theamusement park something happened: Oh
amusement park I hit someone. And uh,
body, you know, in my life, you know.'
yeah. At the
I'd never hit any-
033 I: Uh-huh.
034 S: And I wasted my front light on one side.
035 I: Uh-huh.
036 S
038 S
039
040 S
And let s see. Did anything else happen that day? Ohthat s right. 'Cause I was working at the time. It's
weird because I was working at a motel with my sister—
or either I was working there or I'd just started workingthere or I hadn't worked there or something. But, it
was a job that my sister had gotten for me. And I was—
I think I d just started working there 'cause I didn'tknow the boss that well and I had to miss work that day—the next day—because I had to spend time at a friend'shouse because I didn't want to walk all the way to the
Cape. And uh, I don't know. I guess er, so something
kind of similar to those
—
037 I: Uh-huh.
Those 3 events did happen..
Can you remember how, er, how you made sense of that?
Well, umm, I guess it's kind of— I guess a lot of them were
my I kind of put the blame on me in that uh, I never
bothered to deal with the car. You know. I knew that it
would weird out and I never dealt with it. And then when
it just totally broke down, so that— I put that into—
I
tried to make a scheme for why each individual thing
happened and then I hit the car because I wasn't looking or
something. I tried to make it all fit is what I—But
,
you
know, almost losing my job was, er, that was the shakiest
part, because the job was new and it was a chance to, you
know
—
041 I: That almost sounds like this one.
042 S: Yeah.
043 I: Yeah, it was pretty bad. But I'd forgotten about that one.
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If s a good thing too
.
Stone problem
001 I: Let me move on here irh cu . un
,
xn one of my Docket- q t i„„„ o
poctcet l nave 4 stones =>v-Q u-i i i ^
n
acu ,
_j are black and 1 is uhit-P t '«going to reach into wn te. I m
002 S: MmMm,
003 I: one of my pockets, which is always tough to do sittinedown,
?
and pull out a stone. What color do you tMnT
004 S: Well, is it pocket A or B?
005 I: That would make it easier but I'm not going to-
006 S: You're not going to say. Urn, I'd probably say black.
007 I: MmM. OK. And why would you say black?
008 S: Because there's 5 er, 4 of them and there's only two
white. 3
009 I: MmMm
010 S
011 I
But if it was pocket A, it would be a tough decision. But
I 11 go with the easy decision.
The easy decision. And how likely is it that, in factit's white?
012 S: Oh, it's not—somehow, uh, let's see, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6Well, 1 in 3, maybe.
013 I: 1 in 3. How did you get 1 in 3?
014 S: I just added up the total number of uh, stones.
015 I: When you say "maybe," are you not quite sure if that's
accurate
.
016 S: Ya. It's not accurate.
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017 I: How do you know it's not accurate?
018 S: That's one pocket. And that's another pocket.
019 I: Uh-huh.
020 S: And so given whatever pocket you-of course, urn, yeah
sZTel" ^
SeleCtin§ ^ 2 ^"^^ Uh ' 2 Afferent
021 I: Uh-huh.
022 S
024 S
And-or samples or whatever, uh
, and the probability isnot equally likely that the white will come up in this
situation as that.
023 I: MmMm.
Uh and then--and also by reaching into just one of thepockets, you're not really reaching, or you're not con-
sidering all of these
025 I: Mmm.
026 S: together. You're only considering either this situation
or this situation.
027 I: So are you saying the 1 in 3
—
028 S: Is just er
,
just kind of trying to give an answer as op-
posed to really trying to give a very accurate answer.
029 I: Do you have any idea of how you would give an accurate
answer? I'm not asking you to. But would there be a way
to do it?
030 S: Umm, dealing with these things right there? No, probably
something, uh about, wh— I'd just try and figure out which
pocket you were going into, you know, reaching into, but
I can't really
—
031 I: Well, it, in fact, is black.
032 S: Hmm. Well, it was right.
033 I: Umm, which pocket do you think I drew that out of?
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034 S
035 I;
036 S:
037 I
038 S
039 I
040 S
041 I
042 S:
043 Is
044 S:
045 I:
046 S:
Probably B And I would use it because there's 3 of themin that pocket and
—
How likely is it that, in fact, I pulled it out of pocket A?
Tilel^ll ,
Th3t ' S 3 tOU8h
°
ne
'
rm not su
- ^ con-sider in that situation. Umm, how likely-l don't know what
Maybe just give an estimate.
Well, it's weird because I'm not sure even what to consider.
Mmm.
It's like a-I guess you could just, er, like omit the whites
and^then consider just these 4. And since—well no I
can t do that Uhh, 'cause if I don't consider these whitesthen it doesn't matter. They're all black in each case.
So no matter what pocket you pull out you're going to get ablack, but— urn, so that, oh, I guess what I would do, maybejust— is try to figure out which pocket has—the black hasthe higher probability of coming out of.
MmMm.
And so the— is it a, er
, the question is which pocket you
pulled it out of?
Well, you said probably pocket B and I was asking you how
likely you thought it was, that it, in fact, came out of
pocket A.
Oh, how like, er
—
Or you can answer the question how likely is it that it
came out of pocket B—either question.
B? Oh, OK. So give a number to it. Urn, well it would
seem as though it would be 3 times as great, 'cause, yeah.
Because we have 3 in this pocket so yeah. The likelihood
would be—no. I don't know how to translate it into per-
centages, but it's 3 times.
047 I: 3 times as great?
048 S: Yeah.
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051 I: Uh-huh
052 S: and then if it was this one, it M be white. Sure Andxf it was this one if d be almost close to ^
™
So-and since I don't know which pocket it is I „probably say wh-I would say white.
'
053 I: it'd be more likely to be white?
054 S: Yeah Um, and I think yeah. 'Cause I'd yeah. I wouldtry to consider each one.
055 I: Uh-huh.
S:
wli^^t 0^"" ^ bUck iS SOne ' it,s gonna behite If this black is gone, you know, you're increasingthe chance that white's gonna come up. So- §
057 Ix So any—how likely do you think it is that it will be
white?
058 S: Umm, well if it's the same pocket-So it's really likelyhere. It s like, it's, uh-And here it's pretty likelyAnd maybe it's not fair to draw-to add them together.
Uh, so 1 in—well, no. A 50/50 chance, I'd guess.
059 I: 50/50. How did you get 50/50?
060 S: I added together,
061 I: Just the two whites?
062 S: Just the 4-2 whites and 2 blacks that might be remaining.
063 I: So you think it's
—
064 S: That's contrived.
065 I: You don't—when you say contrived?
066 S: It's just pretty much— I don't really know.
067 I: You still think it's more likely to be white though?
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068 S: I think it's more likely to be white, but—
069 I: Let me reach in-And
, in fact, it's white. So now whatdo you thxnk about which pocket I've been pulling out of ?
070 S: [Points to A],
071 I: it's more likely to be pocket A.
072 S: Right. I would say pocket A.
001 I
004 S
005 I
Lottery problem
One last question. What would you be willing to pay for
a lottery ticket to win a 10,000 dollar car?
002 S: Well, I've got a great volkswagon, so—
003 I: Yeah. Or 10,000 dollars cash prize?
OK. I don't know. A dollar I guess would be— 'cause that'sjust what, uh, lottery tickets cost. That's just what Ithink of them.
Suppose in addition I told you that there were only goine
to be 100 tickets sold?
006 S: Only 100 tickets? Urn, pro—divide the, uh— it's a 10,000?
007 I: Uh-huh.
008 S: By 100. And so that would be— it would be a 10,000— it
would be a 100 dollars a ticket, I guess.
009 I: Uh-huh. Would you be willing to pay 100 dollars for—
010 S: I wouldn't be willing to pay. I mean, I guess that's
similar to, uh, the house raffleing that's been going
on,
011 I: Uh-huh.
012 S: where you pay 100 dollars for a 60,000 dollar house, or
a chance at it. Uh
—
013 I: You do think a 100 dollars would be a fair price to pay?
U5
014 S
015 I
017 I
018 S
I—oh sure, if you wanted to—If vou were into it- If ,
5fi?A?o f f tn:^ perspective of the
016 S: Urn, well it wouldn't-it would depend, urn-No
, I guessit wouldn't be fair to the person who was giving, v u knowselling the ticket, because there'd be no profit in urnla having the raffle. FW« , m,
SOO^nU ^
"nrea
^°
nable if s°n>eone were willing to pavJUO dollars for the ticket?
Urn^for a chance at 10,000 and with the odds of 1 in
019 I: Uh-huh.
020 S: Probably not. I don't think so.
021 I: Suppose you and a friend each bought a ticket, and you
were present along with the other 98 ticket holders" atthe drawing. And just before the drawing you noticed a
very tall person. They just caught your eye because oftheir height. Would you be more surprized in that tallperson won the lottery or if you won it, or if your friend
won it?
022 S: I'd probably—actually I'd probably be more surprized if
I won it
.
023 I: And why is that?
024 S: 'Cause, uh— I think I've won only one thing in my life, so—
025 I: Uh-huh.
026 S: And, and plus—well, that's also partly because I don't, um-
I don't engage in that type of stuff, anyway. But, uh, I'd,
you know, just thinking of it happening. I mean, if in any
real sense it were to happen, it would probably be, probably
pretty weird that it would happen.
027 I: You think you would be less likely to win it than, say,
your friend or the tall person?
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028 S: Probably less likely. I mean, as far as the numbers andstuff go, it would probably—if I was to—It would be thesame, you know, for everyone involved.
APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW 2 TRANSCRIPT
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148
Subject: Sll
Interviewer: C. Konold
Date: May, 1982
Cab problem
^
that Soud"
flrSt qUeSti°n and ma
^be y°u could read
002 S: OK. A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night.Two cab companies, the green and the blue, operate in thecity You are given the following data: 85% of the cabsin the city are green and 15% are blue. A witness identifiedthe cab as a blue cab. The court tested his ability to iden-tify cabs--wait a minute. I'm starting to forget informationhere already.
003 I: MmMm
004 S: —urn, a hit and run— 2 cabs— 2 companies actually. Alright
More green as opposed to blue cabs. And now someone's iden-
tified it as a blue cab. The court tested his ability to
identify cabs under the appropriate visibility conditions.
When presented with a sample of cabs, half of which were blue
and half of which were green, the witness made correct iden-
tifications in 80% of the cases and errored in 20% of the
cases. What is the probability that the cab involved in
the accident is blue rather than green? Whew!
005 I: OK
006 S: Let's see. Am I looking for a number as opposed to like—
007
am I looking to say it's 80% probability that it's was
gree—er, blue rather than green? Is that what I'm—
a
What's the other option? How else would you prefer to give
that?
008 S: "Sure it could have been a blue car."—No. Just that it
would have been urn—a strong—it was more likely as opposed
to less likely—kind of like this fit in. More positive
as opposed to a definite number positive.
009 I: MmMm. OK. Well why don't you give me the second of those
first. You know, just your feeling about more or less, and
then maybe you could try and give it a value.
149
S:
And un^thi,
1
"?'
flrSt £iSUre
°
Ut
"
hat ' S the imP0«-' ^ta.h this is a very tough one to me. Especially at 11
?a«Tguess
he m°rnin8
-
S0l"' s
-- This may he impor-
011 I: The information that
012 S: That there's more green as opposed to blue. I' m not sure
In kn i ^ ^ ri8ht 8°% ° f the tirae in loosing a
r
~
n t!
iS ^P^tant-Um, blue rather than green.Gee. Um, I m trying to figure-just trying to sort it out.it seems as though in a sample where it's 50-50 and he's
right very often, if in the real life situation there's more
or the green, it seems as though the sample in the real life
--would make this situation a little different, you know—
His ability to predict would be changed, but I'm not sure ifthat s right. Umm, I think in making a decision, I wouldjust take his ability to make correct identifications as animportant piece of evidence.
013 I: MmMm
014 S: Umm, and I would say that—and if he said that—he identi-
fies it as a blue cab, then the cab would be probably pretty
close to the same type of probability as his ability to
predict under a, kind of like a neutral type situation. So
that I would say he's probably right. Er , I guess I would
be strongly in favor of his ability to do it
—
015 I: MmMm
016 S: to predict. And the probability would be somewhat close to
the 80 to 20, I think.
017 I: MmMm
018 S: So that this piece of information might—it might affect it
but I'm choosing not to use it.
019 I: MmMm. OK. So
020 S: That's a hard one though.
021 I: So you're feeling that it's
—
you're basing your estimate
mostly on —entirely on the witnessess' ability to identify
cabs under the test conditions.
022 S: Yeah, uh-huh.
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023 I
around the 80%? P^oaonity is
024 S: Probably around the 80%; yeah.
025 I: When you say 'around', are you—
026 S Well, it's weird 'cause there are so few cabc n„r ki
027 I: MmMm.
028 S: And I'm not sure how it would. Well, I would imagine that
£ z:
ld~
gvould reduce ' you know ' the probabii^
029 I: MmMm
030 S that it was a blue cab. Umm, just because there's fewer
^oV^r' ?T\ ^ there ' S 3 situat ion when he'
f u Z ,
Uh
'
he
°nly mak6S a 20% error
>
but, I mean,it he had just been randomly guessing, he would've made
50/6 error.
s
031 I: MmMm.
032 S: And, you know, there's some difference between 20 and 50but it s not—oh, it's significant but it's not uh, it's'
not as though this was like 99% right.
033 I: MmMm.
034 S: So when you change the, you know, the situation—the sample-
-then he may, er
,
this error could go up quite a but.
035 I: MmMm. So if anything, when you say 'about', you're thinking
that it could be lower than 80%?
036 S: Yeah, I would er
, it's weird. I'm not sure how this would
in I think in the direction of lowering the probability.
037 I: MmMm.
038 S: But I'm not sure if it really does. But it may. And so
that I would say that it would probably go down to 70 or
65 or something like that.
039 I: MmMm.
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040 S
041 I
042 S:
Just because there's so few blue in the real world.
and it
U
said
e
thar R^/T^ UP here in (i) were "versed
S% wlrrgreen? * ^ * el* ^e blue and
OK. Umm, yeah, I think it would just be the reverse-that
wo Th
U
h 7Th! P r°bability that a blue cab was involveduld be higher than the 80, er, his ability to predict-so that'd be 80—maybe 85 dict
043 I: MmMm.
044 S: or 90 Just because the probability that it was a blue careven irrespective of his ability, is higher.
045 I: Uh-huh.
046 S: Oh, that's an interesting way of looking at it.
047 I: What's that?
048 S: Well, urn just omit 2 urn, or double (i)—
049 I: Uh-huh.
050 S: that data. And just a chance that it was a green cab, if
we come back to, eh, 85% are green and 15 are blue, just
the chance that it was a green cab or a blue, actually ablue, cab on the spot was, er, is really, really low.
051 I: MmMm.
052 S: But it seems as though— I guess what I'm say er, I guess the
way I'm thinking is that if the witness identifies it as a
blue, and his ability is 80%, then chances are he was right
that it was a blue cab, but without a witness it was pro-
bably a green cab.
053 I : MmMm
.
054 S: 'cause there's so many green cabs.
055 I: MmMm.
056 S: But to jump back to when you said, well "is it important"—
that if we jump back to er , "if 85% were blue, do you think"
057 I: MmMm.
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058 S. Dm, in that situation I think it would just be the umm theprobabxlxty that it was a blue cab would be rea hith
but JLSr J ?°
0d
^ Predict -g, umm, or, not'predtting
of t
1
'!ntlf
^^ 1
whlch the cab is, then it would kind
^
-the probability of it being a blue cab would be probablyeven better than 85%. D Di
059 I: MmMm,
060 S: Maybe.
061 I: What do you-Why did you sort of, er-you were concerned
suddenly when you said that.
062 S: Well, 'cause there's only, er
, 85% of the cabs that are outthere
063 I: MmMm.
064 S
064 I:
065 S:
Umm, are, well anyway, in the other—reverse situation
Yeah, in the reversed.
uh, they're blue. So, it seems weird to say that the pro-bability that on that particular scene, there was a higher
probability that it was a blue cab above the percentage of
cabs
.
066 I: Than the 85?
Yeah. But if this guy's good at predicting, then it's kind
of like a—your* re talking about his ability to predict blu
cabs in that situation as opposed to predicting, you know,
that it's red.
068 I: MmMm. Let me ask you this. Are you more sure when it's
reversed like this—85% are blue—are you more sure that the
probability is above 80% that it was blue than you are that
the probability is below 80% when it's the way it is here?
069 S: Let's see. Above
070 I: Do you know what I'm
—
071 S: in the reverse? Above 85?
072 I: When I gave you the first one you said 80— 'maybe 80', and,
er, you had some belief, but it seemed like a small belief,
that it could be lower than that because of this. Reversed,
153
it seems to me like you're-you said 80 but you're even-you seem somewhat more sure that it will be even above 807I m wonderxng if I was just picking up Qn tha^ r!!°
V6 ^
073 S: let's see I'm gonna go back to the one where, er,it S the normal situation. 85. It seems
—well
, I think
s
* W°Uld be the same. If SOi like the midpoint of where they'll vary, you know, thesxtuatxon as it is now, the probability will be, umm letme see-Yeah. It seems as though the 15%-the 85 and 15%
llal t ^ t
1
?
n
?
W
'
in thiS n°rmal sit^tion, doesn't
thi! llLt %\ r ' lnt ° 3 Str°n§ consideration,s piece of information. And I go pretty much as if thisis the sample that I'm talking about.
074 I: The 15?
075 S: The 15, the blue: Just his ability to predict.
076 I: Uh-huh.
077 S: And so I say it's kind of closer to 80%, the probability
078 I: MmMm.
079 S: in that situation. And when you reverse it, urn, having 85%
of the cabs green er, blue, yeah, it seems as though it in-fluences it more in a positive direction.
080 I: MmMm.
081 S: But it shouldn't.
082 I: It shouldn't?
083 S: No, it should be the same. It's influence should be the
same in either way.
084 Maybe you could tell me what you're thinking now as far as
whether or not this information in (i) is relevant and should
be taken into account in coming up with a value for the
probability.
085 S: MmMm. Urn, I think I— the way I explained it before that,
in the real-life situation there's, urn, a higher number of
these, you know, there's a higher proportion of green as
opposed to blue cabs
urn
,
086 I : MmMm
.
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087 S:
088 I
089 S
090 I:
091 S;
092 I:
093 S:
094 I
095 S
096 I:
097 S
098 I
099 S
100 I
in the real world. And their chance of coming up is 50-50in this one situation and, er , or in this situation. And
'
then this guy s ability to predict is higher than chance,but it s not—it's somewhat higher
MmMm.
Urn, but he still has quite a large error. Umm, so, it
would— it doesn't seem that uh
—
Just your best, er
,
what's your gut feelings about it—your
Well, it could influence it just because it's not— it's not
the same as the 50-50 in which he's using as
MmMm .
in the sample. Um, so it's gonna adjust, er , it's a differ-
ent type of situation under which he would be making iden-
tifications. So that would influence his ability to predict,
er—well, not predict, but identify. But if this is a neu-
tral situation and this 80 to 20 is just, um, a strong in-
dication of just his ability to remember and to pick colors
out, um, and that it's, uh, it's a meaning, er
,
you know,
it's a meaningful number that is important to other situa-
tions other than the test situation. Then even in a situa-
tion where there's 85%, uh, green in the sample, he'll still
be able to predict at an 80 to 20%.
MmMm.
So I think that if this means that he, er, it's not— it's,
uh, meaningful to other than the sample, then this infor-
mation is important. But if this doesn't mean that
—
If this means that he— if this means that he can, er, that
he will be this accurate in other situations, then (i) is
or isn't important did you say?
(i) is not important.
OK.
Because
—
yeah. Because
—
One last question. In giving the answer are you assuming
—
Are you making the assumption that the witness knew the
relative number of cabs in the city?
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101 S: No
Bone-2 problem
001 I:
002 S
003 I
004 S
005 Ii
006 S:
007 I:
008 S
009 I
010 S
011 I
012 S;
013 I
014 S
015 I
016 S
You probably remember this from last time.
Oh, not that guy.
Yeah. Last time we did quite a bit of rolling with this
bone
.
MmMm.
And the first question I asked you about the bone was, if you
roll it which side you thought most likely would land up-
right .
MmMm.
Do you remember what you gave as an answer?
No.
I'm going to ask you the same question again.
MmMm.
I'm not here to test your memory, but I want to change one
thing. Last time you were rolling out of your hands. This
time I want to ask the question what you'll get rolling out
of the cup. Some people felt that rolling it out of the hand
might make a difference.
MmMm.
And I don't think it did, but I don't want that to be an
important question. Umm, and in answering that question
—
which side is most likely— I'm going to offer you any one
of the following 6 pieces of information. Um, I'll give you
a measure of the surface area of each side. Or the results
of 100 rolls made by 16 people. That's a total of 100 rolls,
MmMm •
but 16 people contributed some part of that.
Allright
.
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017 I. The results I got rolling it 1000 times out of the cup.Uh, a drawing of the bone showing the center of gravity
rolls
b°ne t0 l0 °k
°
r results on last 10
018 S: Urn, it's between 2 and 3.
019 I: Between—OK.
020 S: Urn, Urn, I'll go for piece of information number 3.
021 I: Mm, OK. And why do you take that?
022 S: Well beacuse it uh— 1000 is a good number—No.
023 I: MmMm.
024 S: It's a lot of rolls. A lot of trials.
025 I: MmMm.
026 S: And urn, it would seem that the natural er , the natural— the
natural uh, whatever—lie or rolls that will come up—the
most probably roll will probably show. The second prob-
er, most probably roll will show—It seems like a good enough
number—a high enough number to show the, uh, you know, the
way the bone will roll.
027 I: MmMm-
028 S: You know, it's probabilities of the faces coming up. In
number 2, I thought that because it was 16 people doing it,
it would take any bias or whatever out of it. But I think
it's probably pretty limited bias in rolling a bone anyway.
029 I: MmMm-
030 S: If it was like an attitude study or something, then I would
probably go for the 16 as opposed to the 1.
031 I: And this is the second er,
032 S: Yeah.
033 I: If you had a second piece of information, you'd take number
2?
034 S: Uh-huh. Yeah, probably.
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035 I:
036 S:
037 I:
038 S:
039 I
040 S:
041 I:
042 S:
043 I:
044 S:
045 I
046 S
047 I
048 S
049 I;
050 S
051 I
052 S
053 I
Is there any other information in there you think would be
helpful?—or some that wouldn't be helpful at all?
Well, urn, every, er
, this would be pretty insignificant
information.
The results on your last 10?
Yeah. But, because there's no— the 10 rolls isn't that
—
it's not that many,
MmMm.
to, urn, to put trust in. Umm, and I remember looking at the
bone and that didn't help too much. Heh-heh.
MmMm .
Uhh, I'll either, er, maybe the center of gravity would help
or
—
yeah—oh, somewhat. I'm not an engineer so that wouldn't
help me that much.
MmMm
.
And the other one is related somewhat to this one. These
seem to be the 2 more important pieces of information, and
number 3 the most significant.
OK. Well, I'll give you both of those.
Oh.
Huh?
They're both generally pretty close to the same thing.
MmMm. So what would you say then, as to which side is most
likely to land upright if you roll it?
B, C and D. Heh-heh. No. Oh, 1 side? It would just pro-
bably go, er, in either case just D will come up more often
than the B and than C.
MmMm.
But this one never having come up. That's interesting.
So D is the most probable.
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054 S: Yeah.
055 I: What's the probability of D coming up if you roll it?
056 S: Let's see. Almost 4 out of 10, or 40% or whatever.
057 I: MmMm. Now how are you getting 40%?
058 S: Just rounding up on this case.
059 I: MmMm.
060 S: And that, er, it might be worth going to—to 35, or cutting
it right in the middle
—
37h or something.
061 I: Uh-huh. But in that neighborhood anyway?
062 S: Yeah. Around 35 to 40%.
063 I: OK. Well, like last time I'm going to ask you to roll it
10 times—the bone
•
064 S: OK.
065 I: But first to predict what you'll get—how many of each side
that you'll get. And then to write it up there and keep
track. So maybe you could do that.
066 S: So what am I going to do here? Write the numbers of A, B
—
067 I: Well, no. You're going to roll it 10 times.
068 S: Oh.
069 I: And what I'm asking you to do is to predict beforehand what
you'll get—how many of each side you'll get in 10 rolls.
070 S: Oh, OK. Hmm
071 I: OK. You're looking mostly at the results of 100 rolls there
Is that
—
072 S: Oh, yeah.
073 I: Oh, you didn't know you were doing that?
074 S: I was just looking at it 'cause it's on my right.
075 I: Mmm.
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076 S
077 I
078 S
079 I:
080 S:
081 I
082 S;
083 I
084 S
085 I
086 S
087 I
088 S
089 I
090 S
091 I
092 S
093 I;
094 S
095 I
096 S
Focusing right first, I guess. Hmm, you know it could
influence the data. Let's see.
What are you trying to do in looking at that?
Umm, just assign a er, just reduce it to 10.
MmMm.
And assign a value for each one of these.
MmMm.
It feels pretty comfortable to go with these [B and D]
as 3 and 3— 3 and 3. And then this one [C] for 2. But
it seems difficult to assign a 1 and a 1 for, er , 1 for
A and 1 for E.
MmMm,
Just because they have such a low
—
probability of coming up.
I will anyway—see what happens.
I don't think that attaches [referring to lid of felt pen].
It doesn't. OK. Write big? Small?
Large enough so it will er
,
Is that too big?
That's fine.
[writes A-l, B-3, C-2, D-3, E-l]. Is that right? 2, 4
no—Yup , that's right.
So you've opted to give one to A and E
Sure
.
even though you didn't feel quite
—
Right.
How come you decided finally to do it?
Urn, well I don't mind if I'm only like 90% or 80% right so,
I figure one of these is gonna come up—Just spread the
wealth and see which one does. Heh-heh. You can't go wronj
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097 I
098 S
099 I
100 S
101 I
102 S
103 I
104 S
105 I
106 S
107 I
108 S:
109 I;
110 S:
111 I:
112 S;
113 I
114 S:
115 I:
OK. Well—
Oh, I guess the one that doesn't come up will go.
Go ahead and roll it.
[Rolls C] This is the A, right?
That 's C
.
Oh, darn-C.
You wanted your A right off?
Yeah. OK. So we've got 1 here.
Wouldn't you be concerned if you got your A right off. You
might get 2 of them?
No. I don't know. Prob
—
yeah. Getting back to, uh, er
,
getting back to whether or not urn, on each individual throw,
it seems as though they have the same probability all over
again,
MmMm.
of coming up. But then when you put all the throws together,
it seems as though it has to work out to a pattern.
MmMm.
So that, umm, you would think if the A did come up first
then, uhh, it could either fit into the pattern and it
would only come up once, of it could come up again, and it
could come again just because you're throwing it all over.
MmMm
.
You're starting all over with the value, you know, the same
probabilities. So, yeah, if it did come right, er , off
right on— if it did come up right off, then I would think
"oh-oh, could get 2 or 3," or whatever.
MmMm. So which, er, you mentioned a conflict there.
Yeah.
Having each roll—having every thing be independent of the other
one, versus fitting into the overall pattern. Which way do
161
116 S
117 I
118 S
119 I:
120 S
121 I
122 S
123 I
124 S
125 I
126 S:
127 I
128 S
129 I
130 S
131 I
132 S
133 I:
134 S:
you tend to think things happen?
Mm, on each throw it's all over again.
MmMm. OK.
Yeah, it's gonna happen again [rolls D] D. That's good.
That's good?
Yup. [Rolls B] Wow! It's working out like clockwork.
Heh-heh. [Rolls D] D?
MmMm
.
(Rolls D) D again? Oh no! So what, it—hmm. So it seems
as though— it's weird.
What's weird?
Now I could get a million D's. So maybe that—maybe that's
right. It's not the pattern—well, the pattern illustrates
for each trial what the chances are to get the D or a C and
a B.
MmMm.
But it seems as though in the overall thing you would just
get about 35 to 37%.
MmMm.
Would be uh, would be D's.
So what's the conflict you're having right now?
It seems as though, er, when you have—when you get to the
low—well, we're doing 10 here.
MmMm.
So when you get to the real low numbers of trials, and the
probabilities are kind of like, er , they get away from the
whole percentage points. And they get off into 37 or 35
—
well, 35 is fairly whole but
MmMm.
urn, you can't have a half a roll or three quarters of a roll,
162
so that's going to influence the probabilities for the
other values.
135 I: MmMm
136 S So that if this one comes up 4 times, you know, it's gonnainfluence how these others are gonna come.
137 I: MmMm.
138 S: I can't, er, I'm still not sure of the conflict between the
individual trials and the pattern for the whole.
139 I: MmMm. You still feel the conflict?
140 S: Yeah. [Rolls B] Hmm, what kind of bone is this, again?
141 I: It's from a deer.
142 S: A deer. [Rolls B] B again. [Rolls D]
143 I: It sticks in there sometimes.
144 S: [Rolls D]
145 I: It's a D.
146 S: AD, oh-oh.
147 I: That's-that's, er , that's 8 rolls. What's your best guess
as to what you'll get on the next 2?
148 S: Urn, one of these two guys [A or E] . No, probably either a
D or a B
149 I: MmMm.
150 S: on one of 'em and a C on the other.
151 I: MmMm.
152 S: And these guys [A and E]
,
well, I should have left them
out of it.
153
154
I:
S:
So you expect a D or a B and a C.
Yeah. And so I guess I'm going with the idea that— that
they're not going to fit into the pattern but, well yeah;
163
It's just the individual trials that are gonna come up now.
155 I: MmMm. Do you think a C is more likely than a B?
156 S: Urn, no. Probably B. Umm, they're pretty close to the B-the same chance of coming up.
157 I: MmMm.
158 S: But B has come up a lot more than C has so probably B has
a better chance of coming up.
159 I: Based on what you've—right there, that it's come up more?
160 S: Yeah. Just based on, yeah.
161 I: OK.
162 S: 10 trials isn't that many. [Rolls B] Wow, B. Holy cow.
163 I: Now where do you put your money on this last roll?
164 S: The last roll? Let's look at it. Umm. Boy.
165 I: I mean if you were going to bet money on just what you get
on this last roll?
166 S: Probably D.
167 I: MmMm.
168 S: Yeah.
169 I: Based on?
170 S: This and this [1000 data and last 9 rolls].
171 I: MmMm.
172 S: This is becoming, urn, a factor I guess [last 9 rolls].
'Cause I'm seeing how it's rolling now, and it seems to
be influencing it.
173 I: MmMm.
174 S: [Rolls B] B would come up. Heh-heh.
175 I: So you would lose your shirt.
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176 S: OK.
177 I: So what are you, uh, concluding?
178 S: Don't bet on A and E.
179 I: If you had to predict again for 10 more rolls, what would
you predict?
180 S: Probably something like 4, 4 [D andB] and then 2 in here
[ C ] .
181 I: MmMm. And that's based on what you got there?
182 S: Yeah, I's try to base it on that. Although, I probably
still want to go, actually, with a 3 here [B] . Beacuse in
a thousand rolls, 279 came up.
183 I: MmMm.
184 S: Yeah, I'd probably still go with 3 here.
185 I: OK.
186 S: And a 2 [C] and a 4 [D] . Maybe— let me give one of these
peripheral guys another break and give 'urn a one.
187 I: OK. Let me put this aside here.
Painted-die problem
001 I: I've got a 6-sided die here. Suppose I told you that there
was a possibility that it was loaded—that it had been al-
tered in such a way so that such a one
002 S: Right.
003 I: side was slightly more likely than the others to land up-
right. Could you determine whether or not it way loaded?
004 S: I would roll it maybe. Yeah, it seems as though rolling
it—rolling it in water, you know, it wouldn't
—
005 I: Rolling it in water?
006 S: Yeah. Because if it was loaded and there was a heavy side
or something,
165
00 7 I: MmMm.
008 S: maybe if you spun it around it would kind of— the heavy
side down or something.
009 I MmMm. OK. Umm, could you tell just by rolling it on that
table, or something?
010 S: Yeah. It should come up more often on the, you know, the
way you've loaded it.
011 I: MmMm. How many times would you roll, do you think, before
you could conclude whether it was loaded or not?
012 S: Let's see. I was thinking of the 10 here [referring to the
bone] that I rolled. I'm not real sure which sides are
gonna come up. And that [the bone], in a sense, er— it's
not loaded but there is a tendency of a certain spot er,
face to come up.
013 I: MmMm.
014 S: Umm, so, probably like 20 or 30 or something like that.
015 I: MmMm.
016 S: You know—
017 I: Suppose I had rolled it 24 times and these were the results
I got. You know, here are the number of times that each of
the sides came up. What would you conclude looking at
that? There's 24 rolls.
018 S: Hmm. It's weird how the 2 and 4 don't come up that often.
019 I: MmMm.
020 S: If it's a normal die, it has 6 faces. Umm, it should come
up about 3 times for each, er , 4 times each; 4 times 6
is 24. Yeah.
021 I: MmMm.
022 S: So it should come up each side about 4 times if it was
—
let's see—Yeah. I guess like— I guess I would want to say
that it might be loaded to the, you know—
023 I: MmMm.
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024 S
025 I
026 S:
027 I
028 S
029 I
030 S
031 I
032 S
033 I:
034 S:
035 I:
036 S:
036 I
037 S
038 I
039 S
040 I
041 S:
to ^ have the 3 come up, but it's not done in such a way that
it's uh, it's not for sure the 3 is going to come up.
MmMm.
Although if it was 240 urn, then we'd put zeros behind here.
That'd be pretty significant. But, we don't have that infor-
mation.
I see. So if this 240 and then I had 50, 20, 80--
Yeah, then it would be significant, but I don't think
MmMm.
I can say that, this being true.
MmMm. OK. In fact, as far as I know, this die isn't loaded.
OK.
Suppose I took this and I painted 5 of the surfaces black
and left one surface white
MmMm.
and I put it in this cup. And rolled it 6 times. Do you
think I'd be more likely in those 6 rolls to get 6 black
surfaces or to get 5 black and 6 white?
Let's see. Probably, well, it's all centering on that con-
flict whether or not in the individual trials you start off
with a fresh chance of having 6 er , have the 5 black come up
as opposed to the one white.
MmMm.
But then at the end it seems as though after doing the whole,
you know, 6 times, you should get 1 black—or 1 white.
Uh-huh.
I would say you have a higher chance of getting the six black.
MmMm.
I think I'll go with the idea that, urn, on each trial you're
starting off with the second
—
you know—a new set of pro-
babilities—or the same, but starting fresh from each trial.
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042 I:
S5i you- ^ that
' S
^
' 6 blaCk
' beCaUSe ^Ch
043 S: You'd get a better chance to get black.
044 I
045 S
you expect to get black. Umm, if I rolled it 60 times, howmany whites would you predict I'd get in 60 rolls?
Umm then, I'd want to just do it easy and say that becauseyou've got a 5 to 1 thing
046 I: MmMm.
047 S: Urn, 10 of 'em, or close to 10, would be white.
048 I: MmMm. But in 6 you predict I'll get-your best guess is
no whites.
049 S: No whites; Yeah.
050 I: I ^ don't—obviously I didn't paint the die like that, but
I ve got some familiar entities here from last time. I've
got 5 black stones and 1 white stone. Suppose I put these
in the cup and shook it up real well and reached in, not
looking, drew one out, wrote down the color, put it back in,
shook it up again and kept drawing like that.
051 S: MmMm.
052 I: Would that be the same as rolling the die that I described
that was painted?
053 S: Yeah, I think so.
054 I: You think so?
055 S: Yeah. You've got six face or colors
—
056 I: MmMm.
057 S: 6 whatever. Sides— if you want to call them sides.
058 I: MmMm.
059 S: They're stones in this particular case, but there's 6.
And you're drawing one of 'em from the six.
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060 I. MmMm Umm, you know, if I rolled, say, the die on the table
and I kept track of what I got, and then I drew these stones
out of here and kept track and I showed you the results,
would you be able to tell which was from the die and which
1 d gotten from drawing these stones?
061 S: I don't think so.
062 I: Well, I'm going to, in fact, draw 6 times from this and ask
you to predict what I'm going to get. First of all, what
do you guess overall that I'm going to get from 6 draws.
063 S: 6 black.
064 I: 6 black: OK. I've got the first one.
065 S: Black.
066 I: And what's the probability?
067 S: Umm, probability? Uh, and well, 5 in 6.
068 I: 5-
069 S: 5 out of 6; whatever that would be.
070 I: What do you mean 'whatever that would be'?
071 S: Umm, just whatever percentage.
072 I: Oh, whatever percentage: OK. 5 out of 6 is fine.
073 S: 5 out of 6.
074 I: OK. There it is—it's black. OK.
075 S: I keep going with black.
076 I: What't the probability?
077 S: 5 in 6.
078 I: OK. Well I'm going to made you do this. There's two
[showing the 2nd black] OK.
079 S: It's gonna be black.
080 I: What' s the probability?
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081 S:
082 I
083 S:
084 I
085 S
086 I
087 S:
088 I
089 S
090 I
091 S
092 I
093 S
094 I
095 S
096 I
097 S
098 I:
099 S:
100 I:
101 S:
102 I:
103 S:
5 in 6.
[Showed black] That's 3.
Same thing
— 5 in 6 black.
[Showed black] Four. Are you uncomfortable doing this?
Ya, cause this guy's gonna come up white, Heh-he, ha-ha.
OK. Here's another one.
It's still going to be black, and it's gonna be 5 out of 6.
OK. Is that 4 or 5?
I think it's
5
5, yeah.
OK. One more. OK.
It's gonna be black and it's gonna be 5 out of 6, whatever.
Ha-ha [showed black]
It's er, it's black.
Um, now if I did that another 6 times,
MmMm.
Would you expect more likely that I get 6 black, or 5 black
and 1 white?
Um, 6 black. Yeah, I think so.
So you're always going to go with 6 blacks?
Yeah, but somewhere along the line, the white is gonna
come in.
MmMm.
Every once in a while, but I'm not sure, er, I'm not sure
how it figures into the situation though.
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104 I: MmMm.
105 S: Whether or not the-the white uh-it seems when you just-
when you get a large enough samples or trials, then you havethe influence of the white. But under the, uh, the smaller
samples, um, it seems as though— in this case, the black,the one with the highest probability of coming up, er,being chose, becomes more important
—
106 I: MmMm.
107 S: you know, significant. I don't know.
108 I: OK. Umm, you agreed that instead of rolling the die that Idescribed, that had 5 black surfaces and 1 white, that it
would be comparable— I'd get the same results if I put
these stones in the cup.
109 S: MmMm.
110 I: So, therefore, I've somehow made a model of this die with
these stones.
111 S: Right.
112 I: Would there be a similar way that I could model the bone so
that instead of rolling the bone I could pick something out
of, like an urn, and get
113 S: Hmm.
114 I: the same kind of results that I do from rolling the bone?
115 S: Well, probably I wouldn't, er , I would say no beacuse uh,
prob—these are all the same you know. These sides are
all the same.
116 I : MmMm
.
117 S: But the faces of this bone aren't the same.
118 I: MmMm.
119 S: Or their probability of being chosen isn't the same.
120 I: MmMm.
121 S: Unless you could alter the probability of like, er, like of
a particular type of stone to be chosen.
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122 I
123 S:
124 Is
125 S:
126 I:
127 S
128 I
129 S
130 I
131 S:
132 1
133 S:
134 I
135 S:
136 Is
137 S:
138 Is
139 S:
MraMm
.
And I would say no.
Any idea of how to alter the probability of a particular
stone
:
Hmm. Well, let's see. In some way maybe you could phy-
sically change it to make it—I don't know. Naw, I can'tthink of a way to do it.
Let me suggest a couple of things here. I could, for example,label
— put little labels on the stones,
Right
.
one for each side. Oops. Now I've got 6 over here
MmMm.
And if I put these in there and shook and drew, would I
get results like the bone?
No.
That's sort of what you were talking about.
Right
.
Well, is there some container that I could fill with some
number of lettered stones that would give me results like
the bone?
Oh, I see. Yeah. Maybe like, urn, the opening: Maybe the
size of the opening um—Like in this case, A and E maybe will
just exactly fit the size of the opening of the container
MmMm.
so that it would take a near perfect throw and, uh, those
particular stones would have to be at the front of the line
leaving the urn.
MraMm.
And, uh, having the other faces like—like D and B, er, well
B would be probably the smallest and maybe easiest to get
out, and then D would be a little bit more difficult or harder
to get out, and C would be even more difficult and then A
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and E would just have to be perfect.
140 I:
141 S:
142 I:
143 S:
144 I:
145 S:
146 I:
147 S:
148 I:
149 S
150 I
151 S
152 I:
153 S:
154 I:
155 S.
156 I:
I see. So we'd put some covering on this that had a er,
the hole size.
Yeah, something like that.
Um, and then these would be different sizes.
Yeah, right. 'Cause the faces are different,
MmMm.
so different that, uh, it affects their chance of coming up.
So you'd want to do that.
So do you think I could engineer that such that I could
then
Sure.
do that so that you couldn't, er , so that I'd get results
just like rolling the bone?
Sure. Farm out the project to the engineering department.
Let me suggest another alternative to you that somebody
—
OK.
If I didn't suggest it, I wouldn't get to show you all my
beads
.
OK.
Now suppose, um, suppose we took the bone to a statistician
and however they decide it he decided that the probabilities,
um, were very close to these values.
MmMm.
That A was about 5 out of a hundred or 5%; b 29 out of 100,
29%; C 24; D 37; and E 5 and F zero. And so we took a big
can and we took five of these A's and put them in here.
And took 29 B's and put
157 S: MmMm.
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158 I: them in there, and 24 C*s, 37 D's, and 5 E's— I'm just
taking those values. And then we shook and drew from
that. Do you think that would give me results comparable
to rolling the bone?
159 S: Yeah, that would be pretty close. But I would feel uncom-
fortable about not having F represented.
160 I: MmMm.
161 S: But yeah, that would, er
, that's—that would seem as though
it's a fairly—a good way to do it.
162 I: MmMm. OK. Urn, and if I did that again under the table and
I rolled the bone like 100 times and kept track,
163 S: MmMm.
164 I: And I drew 100 times from this and I showed you the results,
do you think there 'd be any way for you to tell which re-
sults I got from the bone and which from drawing from this
urn?
165 S: Umm, yeah. If F did come up once, that would give it away.
166 I: Yeah.
167 S: You know, if F didn't come up, probably not.
168 I: MmMm. In those 100 trials, you know, that I got from the
bone and from drawing from the urn, do you think with one
of those I'd be more likely to get no E's? Like rolling
—
like would I be more likely to get no E's rolling the bone,
or be more likely to get no E's drawing from the urn?
169 S: I think you'd get more—Let's see.
170 I: Or equal?
171 S: Yeah. It would seem as though in this situation [container]
you would, uh, you'd have fewer E's.
172 I: I'd get fewer E's in 100 trials with the urn?
173 S: Yeah, with the urn. Yeah.
174 I: Why?
174
175 S: Cause there's so many-gees-it's kind of like, uh, well
I mean there's so many in this group as opposed to thebone. I don't know, something about the bone and therebeing so many, many, many and many of these guys [D'sl
coming up.
176 I: Uh-huh.
177 S: Uh, it's weird. It's like, urn, if you could al-if you could
alter when you have one of each and, um, the probability of
them coming up is not related to the number.
178 I: Like the one you described first with the opening?
179 S: Yeah, Yeah. It's weird. But I don't know—it's strange,
'cause, uh, if you—if you reduced the population as you
took them out, you know, then it would probably, you know,
I mean it would obviously fall into the nor—the same
pattern. But
—
180 I: What do you mean 'if you reduced the—
'
181 S: As you got a D, you took it out.
182 I: Oh.
183 S: Then you' Id give these guys a break.
184 I: Yeah?
185 S : Then they could come up
.
186 I: Uh-huh.
187 S: But, it seems in this situation, you would get a lot of
Ds and Bs coming up , and some Cs
.
188 I: Do you think I'd get more Ds and Bs in here than I would
get with rolling the bone?
189 S: It would seem as though you would.
190 I: So, you might be able to tell the difference then.
191 S: Um, yeah. I hadn't thought of it—Yeah. Yeah, beacuse it's
like you're only going to take one of these, uh, stones out
at a time.
192 I: Uh-huh.
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193 S: So, you take the D, or whatever, the D or the B or—you
take one out and put it back in. Seems as though you'll
take a lot of these guys [B and Ds]. But the bone's the
same thing, I guess. 'Cause when you roll it, urn, these
two faces come up very often.
194 I: Uh-huh.
195 S: [Looking at the bone and numbers] So I'm trying to decide—
what I'm trying to decide is whether or not, just the num-
bers is a good way to represent the prob—uh—the chances
or the probability that these guys will come up in the
natural situation.
196 I: Uh-huh.
197 S: And, on one side I say it seems as though that they wouldn't,
because—well, I don't know. Maybe they— I think it actually
— it would, because it just represents the chance of them
coming up, and since there's a lot of these guys here—but
there's, uh, in the bone situation, there's just a real high
chance—or just through natural rolling— that the D and C
and B will come up the most often.
198 I: Uh-huh.
199 S: So that I think what it really is, it just—this is a way
of representing the natural—the natural differences in the
probability of the bone. So, actually, I think I'll change
back around and say that if you did it both under the table,
I wouldn't be able to tell the difference.
200 I: Uh-huh. OK. So if I did this 100 times—drew from the can
with these, how many Es would you guess I'd get?
201 S: Um, 100 time? Four of five, something like that.
202 I: Uh-huh. And if I rolled the bone 100 times, how many would
guess?
203 S: About four or five.
204 I: OK. Um, one person suggested another way to do it too.
It's a slight modification of this—that I take the bone
and roll it out of the cup, and I take that letter, whatever
I got, an E, and I put it in there. And then I do that again,
and I roll it, and I get a B, and I put a B in there.
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206 I
207 S
208 I:
209 S:
210 I:
211 S:
212 I
213 S
214 I
215 S;
216 I:
217 S:
218 I:
219 S:
220 I
221 S:
222 I:
223 S:
224 I:
Right
.
And I just keep rolling it
Uh-huh.
a long, long time. Uh, would I reach a point when I could
start drawing from the can full of the beads that I'd put
in there in that manner,
Uh-huh
.
and get results comparable to the bone?
Yeah. I think that would happen.
Uh-huh. Would that feel better than the
—
No. I think it's the same, 'cause this is the same thing,
'cause it's just done—you did all your tab
—
you rolled the
bone and then you filled in the^~-
Uh-huh.
And this was a statistician's, or whatever, probabilities,
right?
Uh-huh.
Oh. Oh, that's right. Oh, well then I would go for the
bone rolling one, because that's more of the natural roll,
of the—of the bone.
Uh-huh. How do you think a statistician would come up with
the probabilities of the bone?
Um, hopefully he rolled the bone.
Hopefully, huh?
Yeah.
What do you mean 'hopefully'? That he didn't just invent
them, you mean?
Yeah, or he didn't just make them up, you know—I guess.
If we took this bone to a statistician and we wanted them
to figure out as precisely as they could the probabilities
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of each side,
225 S: Uh-huh.
226 I: how do you think the statistician would go about doing that?
227 S: Um, well the way I would— I'd just roll it a lot of times
to see which—which faces came up.
228 I: Uh-huh. OK.
229 S: But maybe he would take it to the engineering department and
figure out the center of gravity, the—and etcetera, you
know.
230 I: Uh-huh.
231 S: The properties of the bone that
—
232 I: 'Maybe he would 1
,
you're not sure?
233 S: Well, it depends, you know, on how deep the guy is, you
know.
234 I: Which would be—in your mind, which
235 S: Both.
236 I: is the best way?
237 S: Both. It would be a joint effort.
238 I: Uh-huh.
239 S: 'Cause, um, you'd get the
—
you'd roll the bone and get a rough
idea of the probabilities, or even a fine-tuned idea of
the probabilities, whatever they are, yeah, probabilities
—
and take it to have it analyzed to figure out if, structural-
ly, um, you can understand why these—why these, um, you
know
—
you assign these particular values to each face. And
then through comparing both, just
—
240 I: But I might want to modify what I got rolling it?
241 S: Yeah. Just—it's just kind of like added significance, or
not significance—added, um, sureness, or whatever—belief
in your percentages.
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242 I: Suppose the statistician had rolled it 1000 times, and, you
know, he was on a fixed budget, and he could either roll
it 1000 more times, or take the thing over to the engineering
department and have them look at it. Which do you think he'd
be better off doing?
243 S: Urn, I'd go with the corroborating evidence from the en-
gineers .
244 I: Urn, rather than just duplicating it?
245 S: Mm.
246 I: OK. That's all the questions I've got.

